id string | language string | framework string | title string | description string | owasp string | owasp_api string | owasp_llm string | cwe string | mitre_attack string | severity string | difficulty string | vulnerable_code string | secure_code string | patch string | root_cause string | attack string | impact string | fix string | guideline string | tags list | metadata dict | cvss_vector string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SCP-000197 | Java | Spring Boot | LDAP injection in login | A Spring login builds an LDAP filter with user input. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-90 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Advanced | String filter = "(&(uid=" + user + ")(password=" + pw + "))"; // Vulnerable | String filter = "(&(uid=" + LdapEncoder.filterEncode(user) + ")(password=" + LdapEncoder.filterEncode(pw) + "))"; // Secure | --- a/LdapAuth.java
+++ b/LdapAuth.java
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-String filter = "(&(uid=" + user + ")(password=" + pw + "))";
+String filter = "(&(uid=" + LdapEncoder.filterEncode(user) + ")(password=" + LdapEncoder.filterEncode(pw) + "))"; | Unencoded LDAP filter injection. | user=*)(uid=*)) bypasses auth. | Auth bypass. | Encode LDAP special chars. | Encode LDAP filter inputs. | [
"ldap-injection",
"spring",
"java",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000040 | Python | Flask | Business logic flaw - negative quantity order | An e-commerce checkout accepts negative quantities, allowing refund/balance manipulation. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-840 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | @app.post('/cart/add')
def add():
qty = int(request.form['qty'])
# Vulnerable: negative qty accepted
cart.add(item, qty)
return 'ok'
| @app.post('/cart/add')
def add():
try:
qty = int(request.form['qty'])
except ValueError:
return 'bad qty', 400
# Secure: enforce positive range
if not (1 <= qty <= 100):
return 'qty out of range', 400
cart.add(item, qty)
return 'ok'
| --- a/cart.py
+++ b/cart.py
@@ -2,5 +2,10 @@
- qty = int(request.form['qty'])
- cart.add(item, qty)
+ try: qty = int(request.form['qty'])
+ except ValueError: return 'bad qty', 400
+ if not (1 <= qty <= 100): return 'qty out of range', 400
+ cart.add(item, qty)
| Business constraints (quantity must be positive and bounded) are not enforced server-side. | Order with qty=-5 to receive a negative charge / store credit. | Financial loss and inventory inconsistency. | Validate business invariants server-side with strict bounds and types. | Enforce business rules server-side; never trust client-supplied quantities. | [
"business-logic",
"flask",
"python",
"ecommerce"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000176 | JavaScript | Express | Sensitive data in localStorage | An Express SPA stores a JWT in localStorage, exposed to XSS. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-312 | T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie | Medium | Beginner | localStorage.setItem('token', jwt); // Vulnerable: XSS-readable | // Store only a secure, HttpOnly cookie server-side; SPA reads no token.
// If client must hold it, use memory + short TTL, never localStorage.
const memToken = jwt; | --- a/auth.js
+++ b/auth.js
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-localStorage.setItem('token', jwt);
+// Store token in HttpOnly cookie server-side; keep in memory only if needed
+const memToken = jwt; | localStorage is readable by any XSS on the page. | XSS steals the JWT from localStorage. | Session hijack. | Use HttpOnly, Secure cookies; avoid localStorage for tokens. | Never store tokens in localStorage. | [
"secrets",
"express",
"javascript",
"xss"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "browser",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000442 | TypeScript | Express | XSS via innerHTML | Express handler sets innerHTML with user input. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-79 | T1059.007 | Medium | Beginner | res.render("post", { html: req.query.c }); // view: el.innerHTML = html | res.render("post", { text: req.query.c }); // view: el.textContent = text | --- a/post.ts
+++ b/post.ts
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-res.render("post", { html: req.query.c });
+res.render("post", { text: req.query.c }); | innerHTML with user input. | c=<script>steal()</script> runs. | XSS. | Use textContent. | Avoid innerHTML on user input. | [
"xss",
"express",
"typescript",
"template"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000193 | Python | Flask | Insecure direct object reference on API key | A Flask route returns an API key by id without ownership check. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-639 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Beginner | @app.route('/keys/<int:kid>')
def key(kid):
return jsonify(db.get_key(kid)) # Vulnerable: no owner | @app.route('/keys/<int:kid>')
def key(kid):
k = db.get_key(kid, owner=current_user.id) # Secure
if not k: return abort(404)
return jsonify(k) | --- a/keys.py
+++ b/keys.py
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
- return jsonify(db.get_key(kid))
+ k = db.get_key(kid, owner=current_user.id)
+ if not k: return abort(404)
+ return jsonify(k) | No ownership scoping on key read. | Enumerator reads other users' API keys. | Credential disclosure. | Scope by owner. | Scrope key reads by owner. | [
"idor",
"flask",
"python",
"secrets"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000391 | Kotlin | Android | Missing intent validation (exported component) | An exported Activity processes intent extras without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-926 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | android:exported="true" // Vulnerable: untrusted intents\nval u = intent.getStringExtra("url")\ | android:exported="false" // Secure: or validate caller + sanitize extras\ | --- a/AndroidManifest.xml\n+++ b/AndroidManifest.xml\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-android:exported="true"\n+android:exported="false"\ | Exported component. | Malicious app sends crafted intent. | Privilege escalation. | Set exported=false or validate. | Minimize exported components. | [
"android",
"kotlin",
"intent",
"access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "intent",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000405 | Swift | iOS | JS evaluation in WKWebView (evaluateJavaScript injection) | A WKWebView evaluates a string built from user input. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-79 | T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Medium | Intermediate | webView.evaluateJavaScript("show('\(userInput)')") // Vulnerable: JS injection\ | // Pass data via message handlers with JSON, not string concat\nwebView.evaluateJavaScript("show(data)") // Secure: data via addScriptMessageHandler\ | --- a/WebViewController.swift\n+++ b/WebViewController.swift\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-webView.evaluateJavaScript("show('\(userInput)')")\n+webView.evaluateJavaScript("show(data)")\ | JS string from user input. | userInput=alert(1) executes. | XSS / JS injection. | Use message handlers + JSON. | Avoid JS string concat. | [
"xss",
"swift",
"ios",
"webview"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "web",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000068 | C++ | Qt | Command injection via QProcess shell | A Qt app runs a shell command with user input through QProcess using sh -c. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-78 | T1059.004 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell | Critical | Intermediate | #include <QProcess>
void run(const QString& file) {
// Vulnerable: sh -c with input
QProcess::execute("sh", QStringList() << "-c"
<< QString("render %1").arg(file));
}
| #include <QProcess>
void run(const QString& file) {
// Secure: no shell, arg list, validated
if (file.contains(QRegularExpression("[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]"))) return;
QProcess::execute("render", QStringList() << file);
}
| --- a/render.cpp
+++ b/render.cpp
@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
- QProcess::execute("sh", QStringList() << "-c" << QString("render %1").arg(file));
+ if (file.contains(QRegularExpression("[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]"))) return;
+ QProcess::execute("render", QStringList() << file);
| User input passed to a shell via sh -c allows command injection. | file=x.png; rm -rf ~ runs attacker commands. | Remote code execution. | Avoid sh -c; pass arguments as a list and validate. | No shell in QProcess for untrusted input; use argument lists. | [
"command-injection",
"cpp",
"qt",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Desktop application",
"input_source": "argv",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000100 | Go | Kubernetes Operator | Operator grants excessive RBAC | A Kubernetes operator's ClusterRole grants wildcard verbs/resources, violating least privilege. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-269 | T1078 - Valid Accounts | High | Intermediate | rules:
- apiGroups: ["*"]
resources: ["*"] # Vulnerable: wildcard
verbs: ["*"] # Vulnerable: all verbs
| rules:
- apiGroups: ["app.example.com"]
resources: ["widgets", "widgets/status"]
verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "update", "patch"]
| --- a/role.yaml
+++ b/role.yaml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- resources: ["*"]
- verbs: ["*"]
+ resources: ["widgets", "widgets/status"]
+ verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "update", "patch"]
| Wildcard RBAC grants far more than the operator needs. | A compromised operator can read secrets cluster-wide or delete workloads. | Cluster-wide privilege escalation. | Scope RBAC to specific API groups/resources/verbs; avoid wildcards. | Apply least-privilege RBAC; never use wildcard resources/verbs. | [
"kubernetes",
"rbac",
"go",
"least-privilege"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000350 | PHP | Laravel | Hardcoded APP_KEY / secret | A .env file contains a static APP_KEY. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | High | Beginner | APP_KEY=base64:abcdef1234567890= # Vulnerable: static\ | APP_KEY=${APP_KEY} # Secure: from secret manager\ | --- a/.env\n+++ b/.env\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-APP_KEY=base64:abcdef1234567890=\n+APP_KEY=${APP_KEY}\ | Static secret in repo. | Decrypt sessions/cookies. | Auth bypass. | Generate + externalize. | Externalize APP_KEY. | [
"secrets",
"php",
"laravel",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000098 | YAML | Kubernetes | Missing NetworkPolicy allows lateral movement | A namespace has no NetworkPolicy, so any pod can reach any other pod (including the DB). | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-923 | T1021 - Remote Services | High | Intermediate | # Vulnerable: no NetworkPolicy -> flat network
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: db
| apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-app-to-db
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels: { app: db }
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector... | --- a/networkpolicy.yaml
+++ b/networkpolicy.yaml
@@ -1,5 +1,23 @@
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata: { name: default-deny }
+spec:
+ podSelector: {}
+ policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
+---
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata: { name: allow-app-to-db }
+spec:
+ podSelector: { matchLabels: { a... | Absence of NetworkPolicy leaves pod-to-pod traffic unrestricted. | A compromised web pod connects directly to the database pod. | Lateral movement, data access. | Apply default-deny and explicit allow policies between tiers. | Use NetworkPolicies to segment pod traffic by tier. | [
"kubernetes",
"network",
"yaml",
"segmentation"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000178 | C++ | Qt | Insecure random with rand() for session | A Qt app seeds sessions with rand(), predictable. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-338 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Intermediate | #include <cstdlib>
QString sid() { return QString::number(rand()); } // Vulnerable | #include <QRandomGenerator>
QString sid() { return QString::number(QRandomGenerator::global()->generate64()); } // Secure | --- a/session.cpp
+++ b/session.cpp
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
- return QString::number(rand());
+ return QString::number(QRandomGenerator::global()->generate64()); | rand() is not cryptographic. | Predict session IDs. | Session hijack. | Use QRandomGenerator (CSPRNG). | Use CSPRNG for session IDs. | [
"crypto",
"cpp",
"qt",
"session"
] | {
"domain": "Desktop application",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000204 | Ruby | Rails | SQL injection in calculated finder | A Rails scope interpolates params into a having() clause. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | scope :by, ->(v) { having("total > #{v}") } # Vulnerable | scope :by, ->(v) { having("total > ?", v) } # Secure | --- a/models/order.rb
+++ b/models/order.rb
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-scope :by, ->(v) { having("total > #{v}") }
scope :by, ->(v) { having("total > ?", v) } | Interpolation into SQL clause. | v=0) OR 1=1 -- injects. | Data disclosure. | Use bound params in scopes. | Parameterize scope clauses. | [
"sqli",
"rails",
"ruby",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000276 | C++ | STD | SQL injection with string concat | A C++ DB client concatenates user input into a query. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | std::string q = "SELECT * FROM u WHERE name='" + name + "'";
db.query(q); // Vulnerable | std::string q = "SELECT * FROM u WHERE name = ?";
stmt.bind(1, name); // Secure: prepared
stmt.execute(); | --- a/db.cpp
+++ b/db.cpp
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-std::string q = "SELECT * FROM u WHERE name='" + name + "'";
-db.query(q);
+std::string q = "SELECT * FROM u WHERE name = ?";
+stmt.bind(1, name);
+stmt.execute(); | String concat into SQL. | name=' OR 1=1 leaks rows. | Data disclosure. | Use prepared statements. | Bind all SQL params. | [
"sqli",
"cpp",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000252 | Ruby | Rails | Business logic: integer overflow in points | A Rails service adds loyalty points without overflow guard. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-190 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | def add_points(u, n)
u.points += n # Vulnerable: wraps at max
end | def add_points(u, n)
u.points = [u.points + n, MAX_POINTS].min # Secure: cap
end | --- a/loyalty.rb
+++ b/loyalty.rb
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-def add_points(u, n)
u.points += n
+ u.points = [u.points + n, MAX_POINTS].min | Unbounded integer addition. | Add huge n to overflow to small. | Logic abuse. | Cap accumulators. | Validate numeric bounds. | [
"business-logic",
"rails",
"ruby",
"overflow"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000289 | C++ | STD | Business logic: negative price order | A C++ checkout accepts a negative price from client. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-840 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | void add(Order& o, double price) {
o.total += price; // Vulnerable: negative allowed
} | void add(Order& o, double price) {
if (price <= 0 || price > 1e6) throw std::invalid_argument("bad"); // Secure
o.total += price;
} | --- a/order.cpp
+++ b/order.cpp
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
- o.total += price;
+ if (price <= 0 || price > 1e6) throw std::invalid_argument("bad");
+ o.total += price; | Client price not validated. | price=-100 => negative total. | Revenue loss. | Validate server-side. | Validate business values. | [
"business-logic",
"cpp",
"ecommerce"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000465 | PHP | Laravel | Session fixation in login | Laravel login does not regenerate session id. | A07:2021 - Auth Failures | API2:2023 | CWE-384 | T1539 | Medium | Beginner | Auth::login($user); // same session id | Auth::login($user);
request()->session()->regenerate(); // new id | --- a/AuthController.php
+++ b/AuthController.php
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-Auth::login($user);
+Auth::login($user);
+request()->session()->regenerate(); | No session regeneration. | Fixation: pre-set session reused. | Account takeover. | Regenerate session. | Rotate session on auth. | [
"session",
"laravel",
"php",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000359 | PHP | Laravel | Mass assignment via fill() | A model uses fill() with all request input including role. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-915 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Beginner | User::find($id)->fill($request->all())->save(); // Vulnerable: role mass-assigned\ | User::find($id)->fill($request->only(["name","email"]))->save(); // Secure: guarded\ | --- a/UserController.php\n+++ b/UserController.php\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-User::find($id)->fill($request->all())->save();\n+User::find($id)->fill($request->only(["name","email"]))->save();\ | All fields fillable. | POST role=admin escalates. | Privilege escalation. | Use $fillable / only(). | Whitelist assignable fields. | [
"mass-assignment",
"php",
"laravel",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000043 | Python | Django | Sensitive data in logs | A Django view logs the full request payload including passwords and tokens. | A09:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures | CWE-532 | T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | Medium | Beginner | import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def login(request):
# Vulnerable: logs secrets
logger.info('login payload=%s', request.body)
...
| import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
SENSITIVE = {'password', 'token', 'ssn', 'cvv'}
def _redact(data: dict) -> dict:
return {k: '***' if k.lower() in SENSITIVE else v for k, v in data.items()}
def login(request):
try:
body = request.json()
except ValueError:
body = {}
... | --- a/views.py
+++ b/views.py
@@ -4,3 +4,9 @@
- logger.info('login payload=%s', request.body)
+ SENSITIVE = {'password','token','ssn','cvv'}
+ def _redact(d): return {k:'***' if k.lower() in SENSITIVE else v for k,v in d.items()}
+ logger.info('login attempt user=%s', body.get('user'))
| Raw request bodies containing credentials are written to logs. | Anyone with log access (or a leaked log bucket) harvests live credentials. | Credential disclosure via log aggregation/backups. | Redact sensitive fields before logging; never log full bodies or tokens. | Define a redaction policy; scrub secrets/PII from all logs. | [
"logging",
"django",
"python",
"secrets"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000421 | YAML | Kubernetes | Missing resource limits (DoS) | A container has no CPU/memory limits. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-400 | T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service | Medium | Beginner | resources: {} # Vulnerable: no limits, can starve node\ | resources:\n limits:\n cpu: "500m"\n memory: "256Mi"\n requests:\n cpu: "100m"\n memory: "128Mi" # Secure\ | --- a/deploy.yaml\n+++ b/deploy.yaml\n@@ -1,2 +1,9 @@\n-resources: {}\n+resources:\n+ limits:\n+ cpu: "500m"\n+ memory: "256Mi"\n+ requests:\n+ cpu: "100m"\n+ memory: "128Mi"\ | No resource limits. | Resource exhaustion / node DoS. | Availability loss. | Set limits/requests. | Bound container resources. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"dos",
"resource"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000407 | Swift | iOS | Path traversal in document file read | An app reads a file from a user-supplied name in Documents. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-22 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | let url = docs.appendingPathComponent(name) // Vulnerable: traversal\ | let safe = URL(fileURLWithPath: name).lastPathComponent\nlet url = docs.appendingPathComponent(safe) // Secure: basename\ | --- a/Files.swift\n+++ b/Files.swift\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-let url = docs.appendingPathComponent(name)\n+let safe = URL(fileURLWithPath: name).lastPathComponent\n+let url = docs.appendingPathComponent(safe)\ | Unsanitized filename. | name=../../etc/passwd reads file. | File disclosure. | Basename + confine. | Confine file paths. | [
"path-traversal",
"swift",
"ios",
"file-read"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000443 | JavaScript | Next.js | Server action SQL injection | Next.js server action builds a query by concatenation. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 | High | Intermediate | 'use server';
export async function search(q) {
return db.query(`SELECT * FROM p WHERE name = '${q}'`);
} | 'use server';
export async function search(q) {
return db.query('SELECT * FROM p WHERE name = $1', [q]);
} | --- a/actions.ts
+++ b/actions.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export async function search(q) {
- return db.query(`SELECT * FROM p WHERE name = '${q}'`);
+export async function search(q) {
+ return db.query('SELECT * FROM p WHERE name = $1', [q]); | Template literal into SQL. | q=' OR 1=1 dumps rows. | Data disclosure. | Use bound parameters. | Bind all SQL params. | [
"sqli",
"nextjs",
"javascript",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000241 | Ruby | Rails | Mass assignment via update_attributes | A Rails controller updates all params including admin flag. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-915 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Beginner | def update
@user.update_attributes(params[:user]) # Vulnerable: binds admin
end | def update
@user.update_attributes(params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email)) # Secure
end | --- a/users_controller.rb
+++ b/users_controller.rb
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-def update
@user.update_attributes(params[:user])
+ @user.update_attributes(params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email))
end | All params bound to model. | POST user[admin]=1 escalates. | Privilege escalation. | Use strong parameters. | Always permit explicit params. | [
"mass-assignment",
"rails",
"ruby",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000409 | Swift | iOS | URL scheme hijacking (openURL without validation) | An app opens a URL from a universal link without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | UIApplication.shared.open(url) // Vulnerable: opens untrusted URL\ | guard url.scheme == "https", url.host == "app.example.com" else { return } // Secure\nUIApplication.shared.open(url)\ | --- a/DeepLink.swift\n+++ b/DeepLink.swift\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-UIApplication.shared.open(url)\n+guard url.scheme == "https", url.host == "app.example.com" else { return }\n+UIApplication.shared.open(url)\ | Unvalidated URL open. | Malicious universal link triggers action. | Phishing/abuse. | Validate scheme/host. | Validate deep links. | [
"deep-link",
"swift",
"ios",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "deeplink",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000478 | C | POSIX | Stack buffer overflow in gets | C program copies with unbounded gets. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-120 | T1203 | High | Beginner | char buf[64];
gets(buf); // no bound | char buf[64];
if (!fgets(buf, sizeof buf, stdin)) return; // bounded | --- a/legacy.c
+++ b/legacy.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-char buf[64];
-gets(buf);
+char buf[64];
+if (!fgets(buf, sizeof buf, stdin)) return; | gets has no bounds. | Overflow stack. | RCE. | Use fgets/string. | Never use gets. | [
"buffer-overflow",
"c",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "stdin",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000274 | C++ | STD | Use-after-free with raw pointer | A C++ class returns a raw pointer to internal buffer after free. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-416 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | High | Advanced | int* leak() {
int* p = new int(1);
delete p;
return p; // Vulnerable: dangling
} | std::unique_ptr<int> leak() {
return std::make_unique<int>(1); // Secure: ownership
} | --- a/leak.cpp
+++ b/leak.cpp
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-int* leak() {
int* p = new int(1);
delete p;
return p;
+std::unique_ptr<int> leak() {
+ return std::make_unique<int>(1); | Returning freed pointer. | Heap confusion / RCE. | Memory corruption. | Use smart pointers. | Prefer unique_ptr/shared_ptr. | [
"use-after-free",
"cpp",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "internal",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000476 | TypeScript | NestJS | Insecure JWT secret in NestJS | NestJS JWT module uses weak secret. | A07:2021 - Auth Failures | API2:2023 | CWE-345 | T1600 | Critical | Advanced | JwtModule.register({ secret: "secret", signOptions: { expiresIn: "1h" } }) | JwtModule.register({ secret: process.env.JWT_SECRET, signOptions: { expiresIn: "1h" } }) | --- a/auth.module.ts
+++ b/auth.module.ts
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-JwtModule.register({ secret: "secret", signOptions: { expiresIn: "1h" } })
+JwtModule.register({ secret: process.env.JWT_SECRET, signOptions: { expiresIn: "1h" } }) | Weak hardcoded secret. | Forge tokens. | Auth bypass. | Use env secret. | Externalize JWT secret. | [
"jwt",
"nestjs",
"typescript",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000114 | JavaScript | Next.js | Server component fetches with no auth check | A Next.js server component reads protected data without verifying the session. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-862 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | export default async function Page({ params }) {
const data = await db.invoice.find(params.id); // Vulnerable: no user
return <Invoice data={data} />;
} | export default async function Page({ params }) {
const user = await getServerSession();
const data = await db.invoice.find({ id: params.id, userId: user.id }); // Secure
if (!data) notFound();
return <Invoice data={data} />;
} | --- a/invoice/page.tsx
+++ b/invoice/page.tsx
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
- const data = await db.invoice.find(params.id);
+ const user = await getServerSession();
+ const data = await db.invoice.find({ id: params.id, userId: user.id });
+ if (!data) notFound(); | Server component omits ownership check, enabling IDOR. | User changes id to read other invoices. | Cross-user data disclosure. | Scope queries by authenticated user. | Authorize in server components too. | [
"idor",
"nextjs",
"typescript",
"access-control"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000020 | TypeScript | NestJS | Authorization bypass via missing guard on admin route | An admin NestJS resolver lacks a roles guard, allowing any authenticated user to act as admin. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-862 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | @Resolver(() => User)
export class AdminResolver {
@Mutation(() => Boolean)
async deleteUser(@Args('id') id: string) {
// Vulnerable: no RolesGuard / admin check
return this.users.remove(id);
}
}
| @Resolver(() => User)
export class AdminResolver {
@Mutation(() => Boolean)
@UseGuards(GqlAuthGuard, RolesGuard)
@Roles('admin')
async deleteUser(@Ctx() ctx: AuthContext, @Args('id') id: string) {
return this.users.remove(ctx.user.tenantId, id);
}
}
| --- a/admin.resolver.ts
+++ b/admin.resolver.ts
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
@Mutation(() => Boolean)
+ @UseGuards(GqlAuthGuard, RolesGuard)
+ @Roles('admin')
async deleteUser(@Args('id') id: string) {
+ return this.users.remove(ctx.user.tenantId, id);
| The mutation enforces authentication but not the admin role, so any user can delete anyone. | A normal user calls deleteUser(id) for another account and succeeds. | Privilege escalation and destructive actions by unauthorized users. | Apply role/permission guards and scope operations to the caller's tenant. | Combine authentication + authorization guards; scope by tenant on every mutation. | [
"authorization",
"nestjs",
"typescript",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "args",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000199 | Rust | Actix | Unvalidated redirect in Actix | An Actix handler redirects to a request param without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | async fn go(q: web::Query<Q>) -> impl Responder {
HttpResponse::Found().append_header(("Location", q.url)).finish() // Vulnerable
} | async fn go(q: web::Query<Q>) -> impl Responder {
if !q.url.starts_with('/') || q.url.starts_with("//") { // Secure
return HttpResponse::BadRequest().finish();
}
HttpResponse::Found().append_header(("Location", q.url)).finish()
} | --- a/go.rs
+++ b/go.rs
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
- HttpResponse::Found().append_header(("Location", q.url)).finish()
+ if !q.url.starts_with('/') || q.url.starts_with("//") {
+ return HttpResponse::BadRequest().finish();
+ }
+ HttpResponse::Found().append_header(("Location", q.url)).finish() | Unvalidated redirect target. | url=//evil.com phishing. | Phishing. | Allowlist relative paths. | Validate redirects. | [
"open-redirect",
"rust",
"actix",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000119 | C# | ASP.NET Core | XML deserialization without known types | An ASP.NET Core API deserializes XML without restricting types, enabling RCE. | A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures | CWE-502 | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | Critical | Advanced | var xs = new XmlSerializer(typeof(Config)); // Vulnerable: type confusion
var c = (Config)xs.Deserialize(stream); | var xs = new XmlSerializer(typeof(Config), new[] { typeof(Config) }); // Secure
// reject xsi:type / known types only
var c = (Config)xs.Deserialize(stream); | --- a/ConfigLoader.cs
+++ b/ConfigLoader.cs
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-var xs = new XmlSerializer(typeof(Config));
+var xs = new XmlSerializer(typeof(Config), new[] { typeof(Config) });
+// reject xsi:type / known types only | Permissive XML deserialization allows attacker-chosen types. | Attacker supplies xsi:type to instantiate a gadget class. | Remote code execution. | Restrict to known types; avoid NetDataContractSerializer. | Lock down XML deserialization to known types. | [
"deserialization",
"aspnet",
"csharp",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000355 | PHP | Laravel | Open redirect | A redirect uses a param without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | return redirect()->to($request->input("url")); // Vulnerable\ | $url = $request->input("url");\nif (!str_starts_with($url, "/") || str_starts_with($url, "//")) $url = "/"; // Secure\nreturn redirect()->to($url);\ | --- a/AuthController.php\n+++ b/AuthController.php\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\n-return redirect()->to($request->input("url"));\n+$url = $request->input("url");\n+if (!str_starts_with($url, "/") || str_starts_with($url, "//")) $url = "/";\n+return redirect()->to($url);\ | Unvalidated redirect. | url=//evil.com phishing. | Phishing. | Allowlist relative. | Validate redirects. | [
"open-redirect",
"php",
"laravel",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000376 | Rust | Actix | Use of unsafe with raw pointer | A handler dereferences a raw pointer unsafely. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-476 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | High | Advanced | unsafe { let v = *ptr; } // Vulnerable: unchecked raw ptr\ | if let Some(v) = ptr.as_ref() { /* use v */ } // Secure: safe wrapper\ | --- a/handler.rs\n+++ b/handler.rs\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-unsafe { let v = *ptr; }\n+if let Some(v) = ptr.as_ref() { /* use v */ }\ | Unchecked unsafe deref. | Null/wild ptr crash or corrupt. | Memory corruption. | Avoid unsafe; use safe wrappers. | Minimize unsafe. | [
"memory-safety",
"rust",
"actix",
"unsafe"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "internal",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000213 | Python | Flask | Weak password hashing (md5) | A Flask app stores MD5 password hashes without salt. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-916 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Beginner | import hashlib
def hash_pw(pw):
return hashlib.md5(pw.encode()).hexdigest() # Vulnerable: fast + unsalted | import bcrypt
def hash_pw(pw):
return bcrypt.hashpw(pw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode() # Secure: slow + salt | --- a/auth.py
+++ b/auth.py
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
- return hashlib.md5(pw.encode()).hexdigest()
+ return bcrypt.hashpw(pw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode() | MD5 is fast and unsalted; trivially cracked. | Rainbow tables / cracking recover passwords. | Credential compromise. | Use bcrypt/argon2 with per-user salt. | Hash passwords with slow, salted KDFs. | [
"crypto",
"flask",
"python",
"passwords"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000444 | PHP | Laravel | IDOR on document | Laravel document route returns by id without owner check. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - BOLA | CWE-639 | T1190 | High | Beginner | $doc = Document::find($id);
return response()->file($doc->path); // no owner | $doc = Document::where("id", $id)
->where("user_id", auth()->id())->firstOrFail();
return response()->file($doc->path); // scoped | --- a/DocsController.php
+++ b/DocsController.php
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-$doc = Document::find($id);
-return response()->file($doc->path);
+$doc = Document::where("id", $id)
+ ->where("user_id", auth()->id())->firstOrFail();
+return response()->file($doc->path); | No ownership scoping. | Enumerate others documents. | PII disclosure. | Scope by owner. | Authorize reads by owner. | [
"idor",
"laravel",
"php",
"access-control"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000474 | Java | Spring Boot | Weak OTP random | Spring OTP generator uses Math.random. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-338 | T1600 | High | Intermediate | int otp = (int)(Math.random() * 1000000); | int otp = new SecureRandom().nextInt(1000000); | --- a/OtpService.java
+++ b/OtpService.java
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-int otp = (int)(Math.random() * 1000000);
+int otp = new SecureRandom().nextInt(1000000); | Non-CSPRNG OTP. | Predict OTP. | Account takeover. | Use SecureRandom. | Use CSPRNG for OTP. | [
"crypto",
"spring",
"java",
"otp"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000365 | PHP | Laravel | Insecure random for token | A token generator uses mt_rand. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-338 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Intermediate | $tok = md5(mt_rand() . time()); // Vulnerable: predictable\ | $tok = bin2hex(random_bytes(32)); // Secure: CSPRNG\ | --- a/Token.php\n+++ b/Token.php\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-$tok = md5(mt_rand() . time());\n+$tok = bin2hex(random_bytes(32));\ | Non-CSPRNG token. | Predict token sequence. | Token forgery. | Use random_bytes. | Use CSPRNG for tokens. | [
"crypto",
"php",
"laravel",
"tokens"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000219 | Python | Flask | Command injection in subprocess | A Flask route passes user input to a shell via os.popen. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-78 | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | High | Beginner | @app.route("/ping")
def ping():
host = request.args.get("host")
out = os.popen("ping -c1 " + host).read() # Vulnerable | @app.route("/ping")
def ping():
host = request.args.get("host", "")
if not re.match(r"^[\w.-]+$", host): return abort(400) # Secure: validate
out = subprocess.run(["ping", "-c1", host], capture_output=True).stdout | --- a/ping.py
+++ b/ping.py
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
- out = os.popen("ping -c1 " + host).read()
+ if not re.match(r"^[\w.-]+$", host): return abort(400)
+ out = subprocess.run(["ping", "-c1", host], capture_output=True).stdout | Shell string concatenation with user input. | host=1.2.3.4;cat /etc/passwd executes. | Command injection / RCE. | Use argument list; validate input. | Avoid shell; pass arg arrays. | [
"command-injection",
"flask",
"python",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000428 | YAML | Kubernetes | ReadOnlyRootFilesystem not set | A container allows writes to root filesystem. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-732 | T1611 - Escape to Host | Medium | Beginner | securityContext:\n readOnlyRootFilesystem: false # Vulnerable: writable root\ | securityContext:\n readOnlyRootFilesystem: true # Secure: immutable root\ | --- a/deploy.yaml\n+++ b/deploy.yaml\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-securityContext:\n readOnlyRootFilesystem: false\n+securityContext:\n+ readOnlyRootFilesystem: true\ | Writable root fs. | Drop malicious binaries. | Persistence. | Set readOnlyRootFilesystem. | Immutable root fs. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"filesystem",
"container"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000419 | YAML | Kubernetes | Allow-all NetworkPolicy missing | A namespace has no NetworkPolicy, allowing all pod-to-pod traffic. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-284 | T1046 - Network Service Discovery | Medium | Intermediate | # No NetworkPolicy defined # Vulnerable: default-allow all\ | apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: NetworkPolicy\nspec:\n podSelector: {}\n policyTypes: ["Ingress"]\n ingress: [{from: [{podSelector: {matchLabels: {tier: frontend}}}]}] # Secure\ | --- a/networkpolicy.yaml\n+++ b/networkpolicy.yaml\n@@ -1,2 +1,8 @@\n-# No NetworkPolicy defined\n+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\n+kind: NetworkPolicy\n+spec:\n+ podSelector: {}\n+ policyTypes: ["Ingress"]\n+ ingress: [{from: [{podSelector: {matchLabels: {tier: frontend}}}]}]\ | No network segmentation. | Lateral movement between pods. | Blast radius increase. | Define NetworkPolicy. | Segment pod traffic. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"network",
"segmentation"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000028 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Insecure deserialization with BinaryFormatter | An ASP.NET Core endpoint deserializes uploaded bytes with BinaryFormatter, enabling RCE. | A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures | CWE-502 | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | Critical | Advanced | [HttpPost("load")]
public IActionResult Load([FromBody] byte[] data)
{
// Vulnerable: BinaryFormatter is unsafe
var obj = (Payload)BinaryFormatterFormatter.Deserialize(data);
return Ok(obj);
}
| [HttpPost("load")]
public IActionResult Load([FromBody] MyDto dto)
{
// Secure: model-bound, validated DTO; no binary deserialization
if (!ModelState.IsValid) return BadRequest(ModelState);
var result = _service.Handle(dto);
return Ok(result);
}
| --- a/PayloadController.cs
+++ b/PayloadController.cs
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
- var obj = (Payload)BinaryFormatterFormatter.Deserialize(data);
- return Ok(obj);
+ if (!ModelState.IsValid) return BadRequest(ModelState);
+ var result = _service.Handle(dto);
+ return Ok(result);
| BinaryFormatter executes code during deserialization of untrusted data. | Attacker uploads a gadget chain payload that runs commands on deserialization. | Remote code execution on the server. | Remove BinaryFormatter entirely; bind to typed DTOs and validate with model state. | Never deserialize untrusted data with BinaryFormatter; use typed DTOs + validation. | [
"deserialization",
"aspnet",
"csharp",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000087 | Python | FastAPI | Missing idempotency on payment endpoint | A payment endpoint processes the same request twice if retried, double-charging. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-840 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | @app.post('/pay')
def pay(req: PaymentReq):
# Vulnerable: no idempotency key check
charge_card(req.user, req.amount)
return {'ok': True}
| @app.post('/pay')
def pay(req: PaymentReq, idem: str = Header(...)):
# Secure: dedupe by idempotency key
if redis.exists('idem:' + idem):
return {'ok': True, 'cached': True}
charge_card(req.user, req.amount)
redis.setex('idem:' + idem, 86400, '1')
return {'ok': True}
| --- a/pay.py
+++ b/pay.py
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
-def pay(req: PaymentReq):
- charge_card(req.user, req.amount)
+def pay(req: PaymentReq, idem: str = Header(...)):
+ if redis.exists('idem:' + idem):
return {'ok': True, 'cached': True}
+ charge_card(req.user, req.amount)
+ redis.setex('idem:' + idem, 86400... | No idempotency key, so client retries cause duplicate charges. | Network retry or replay of the request double-charges the customer. | Financial loss, customer trust damage. | Require and dedupe on an idempotency key per mutating request. | Make payment endpoints idempotent via idempotency keys. | [
"business-logic",
"fintech",
"fastapi",
"idempotency"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "header",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000210 | Python | FastAPI | Authorization bypass via missing dependency | A FastAPI route declares an auth dependency but the call site omits it. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-862 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Advanced | def get_current_user(): # defined but unused
return decode_token()
@app.delete('/admin/user/{uid}')
def delete(uid: int): # Vulnerable: no Depends
repo.remove(uid)
return {'ok': True} | def get_current_user(t: str = Depends(bearer)):
return decode_token(t)
@app.delete('/admin/user/{uid}')
def delete(uid: int, user=Depends(get_current_user)): # Secure
if not user.is_admin: raise HTTPException(403)
repo.remove(uid)
return {'ok': True} | --- a/main.py
+++ b/main.py
@@ -4,4 +4,6 @@
-@app.delete('/admin/user/{uid}')
def delete(uid: int):
- repo.remove(uid)
+@app.delete('/admin/user/{uid}')
def delete(uid: int, user=Depends(get_current_user)):
+ if not user.is_admin: raise HTTPException(403)
+ repo.remove(uid) | Auth dependency not attached to the route. | Unauthenticated delete of any user. | Privilege escalation, data loss. | Attach auth dependency; enforce role. | Always attach auth dependencies. | [
"authorization",
"fastapi",
"python",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000104 | Python | MicroPython | Telnet exposed without authentication on device | An IoT gateway starts a Telnet server with no auth, giving root shell access. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | CWE-306 | T1021 - Remote Services | Critical | Beginner | import utelnet
# Vulnerable: telnet with no auth
utelnet.start(port=23, login=None, password=None)
| import ussl, socket
# Secure: SSH/TLS with key auth only
server = socket.socket()
server = ussl.wrap_socket(server, keyfile='dev.key', certfile='dev.crt')
server.bind(('', 22))
server.listen(1)
| --- a/shell.py
+++ b/shell.py
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
-utelnet.start(port=23, login=None, password=None)
+server = socket.socket()
+server = ussl.wrap_socket(server, keyfile='dev.key', certfile='dev.crt')
+server.bind(('', 22))
+server.listen(1)
| An unauthenticated Telnet server exposes a root shell on the LAN. | Anyone on the network connects and gains full device control. | Complete device compromise. | Disable Telnet; use SSH/TLS with key-based auth. | Never expose unauthenticated shells; use SSH/TLS with keys. | [
"iot",
"python",
"telnet",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "network",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000255 | Ruby | Rails | Authorization missing on destroy | A Rails destroy action has no ownership or role check. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-862 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Beginner | def destroy
Comment.find(params[:id]).destroy # Vulnerable: anyone
end | def destroy
Comment.where(id: params[:id], user_id: current_user.id).destroy_all # Secure
end | --- a/comments_controller.rb
+++ b/comments_controller.rb
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-def destroy
Comment.find(params[:id]).destroy
+ Comment.where(id: params[:id], user_id: current_user.id).destroy_all | No ownership on delete. | Anyone deletes any comment. | Data loss. | Scope delete by owner. | Authorize deletions. | [
"authorization",
"rails",
"ruby",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000026 | PHP | Laravel | Unvalidated redirect in controller | A Laravel controller returns a redirect to a user-supplied URL without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | public function auth(Request $request)
{
// Vulnerable: arbitrary redirect
return redirect($request->input('return'));
}
| public function auth(Request $request)
{
$target = $request->input('return', '/');
// Secure: only same-host relative paths
if (!str_starts_with($target, '/') || str_starts_with($target, '//')) {
$target = '/';
}
return redirect($target);
}
| --- a/AuthController.php
+++ b/AuthController.php
@@ -2,4 +2,8 @@
- return redirect($request->input('return'));
+ $target = $request->input('return', '/');
+ if (!str_starts_with($target, '/') || str_starts_with($target, '//')) $target = '/';
+ return redirect($target);
| Redirect target is taken from input and passed straight to redirect() without checks. | return=https://phish.example steals users after they authenticate. | Phishing and credential harvesting via trusted-domain redirect. | Constrain redirects to same-origin relative paths or an allowlist of hosts. | Validate redirect targets; reject absolute/protocol-relative URLs. | [
"open-redirect",
"laravel",
"php",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000297 | Scala | Play | Insecure JWT verification (none alg) | A Play JWT verifier accepts the none algorithm. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-345 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | Critical | Advanced | def verify(t: String) = JwtJson4s("secret").decodeJson(t) // Vulnerable if none allowed | def verify(t: String) = JwtJson4s("secret", JwtAlgorithm.HS256).decodeJson(t) // Secure: pin alg | --- a/Auth.scala
+++ b/Auth.scala
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-def verify(t: String) = JwtJson4s("secret").decodeJson(t)
+def verify(t: String) = JwtJson4s("secret", JwtAlgorithm.HS256).decodeJson(t) | No algorithm pinning. | Forge alg=none token. | Auth bypass. | Pin algorithm. | Forbid none algorithm. | [
"jwt",
"scala",
"play",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "header",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000168 | Swift | iOS | Allowing arbitrary URL schemes (deep link abuse) | An iOS app handles a deep link that triggers privileged actions without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-939 | T1398 - Mobile Application Exploitation | Medium | Intermediate | func application(_ a: UIApplication, open u: URL, ...) {
if u.scheme == "myapp" { handle(u) } // Vulnerable: no validation
} | func application(_ a: UIApplication, open u: URL, ...) {
guard u.scheme == "myapp", let host = u.host, allowedHosts.contains(host) else { return }
handle(validated: u) // Secure
} | --- a/AppDelegate.swift
+++ b/AppDelegate.swift
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
- if u.scheme == "myapp" { handle(u) }
+ guard u.scheme == "myapp", let host = u.host, allowedHosts.contains(host) else { return }
+ handle(validated: u) | Deep link handled without validating host/action. | Malicious site opens myapp://admin/reset to trigger action. | Privileged action via deep link. | Validate host and whitelist actions. | Validate deep links; whitelist hosts/actions. | [
"ios",
"swift",
"deeplink",
"mobile"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "url-scheme",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000432 | Python | Flask | eval on FHIR observation value | Flask FHIR endpoint evals a coded value from the request. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-95 | T1059 | Critical | Advanced | @app.route("/calc", methods=["POST"])
def calc():
return str(eval(request.json["expr"])) # RCE | @app.route("/calc", methods=["POST"])
def calc():
return str(safe_calc(request.json["expr"])) # sandboxed parser | --- a/calc.py
+++ b/calc.py
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
- return str(eval(request.json["expr"]))
+ return str(safe_calc(request.json["expr"])) | eval on user expression. | expr=__import__('os').system('...') | Remote code execution. | Use a safe expression parser. | Never eval user input. | [
"injection",
"eval",
"healthcare",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Healthcare",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000456 | Java | Spring Boot | No CSRF on GraphQL mutations | Spring GraphQL allows batching enabling CSRF. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-352 | T1190 | Medium | Intermediate | @PostMapping("/graphql")
public ResponseEntity q(@RequestBody body) { ... } | @PostMapping("/graphql")
@CsrfToken
public ResponseEntity q(@RequestBody body) { ... } | --- a/GraphqlCtrl.java
+++ b/GraphqlCtrl.java
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
@PostMapping("/graphql")
+@CsrfToken
public ResponseEntity q(@RequestBody body) { ... } | Batched queries + no CSRF. | Batch authenticated mutations via CSRF. | Unauthorized actions. | Require CSRF on mutations. | Protect GraphQL mutations. | [
"csrf",
"graphql",
"spring",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000396 | Kotlin | Android | Exposed broadcast receiver | A broadcast receiver is exported and processes untrusted broadcasts. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-926 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | android:exported="true" // Vulnerable: any app can send\ | android:exported="false" // Secure: or use permission-protected receiver\ | --- a/AndroidManifest.xml\n+++ b/AndroidManifest.xml\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-android:exported="true"\n+android:exported="false"\ | Exported receiver. | Malicious broadcast triggers action. | Privilege escalation. | Unexport or permission-gate. | Minimize exported components. | [
"android",
"kotlin",
"broadcast",
"access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "broadcast",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000402 | Swift | iOS | Hardcoded API key in Info.plist | An iOS app stores a key in Info.plist. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | High | Beginner | let key = Bundle.main.infoDictionary?["API_KEY"] as? String // Vulnerable: in binary\ | // Fetch from backend at runtime; never ship secret in bundle\nlet key = try await fetchKey() // Secure\ | --- a/Api.swift\n+++ b/Api.swift\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-let key = Bundle.main.infoDictionary?["API_KEY"] as? String\n+let key = try await fetchKey()\ | Secret in bundle. | Extract from IPA. | Key compromise. | Backend proxy. | Don't embed secrets in app. | [
"secrets",
"swift",
"ios",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000106 | Python | IoT Gateway | Default credentials on management API | An IoT gateway API accepts a hardcoded default admin password. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-1392 | T1078.001 - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts | Critical | Beginner | def login(u, p):
# Vulnerable: default password
if u == 'admin' and p == 'admin':
return issue_token(u)
| def login(u, p):
user = db.get_user(u)
if user and argon2.verify(p, user.pw_hash):
if not user.force_reset:
return issue_token(u)
return None
| --- a/auth.py
+++ b/auth.py
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
- if u == 'admin' and p == 'admin':
- return issue_token(u)
+ user = db.get_user(u)
+ if user and argon2.verify(p, user.pw_hash):
+ return issue_token(u)
| A static default credential grants trivial admin access. | Attacker logs in as admin with 'admin'/'admin'. | Full device/gateway takeover. | Store hashed credentials; force password change on first login; no defaults. | No default credentials; use hashed passwords and forced reset. | [
"iot",
"python",
"default-creds",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000277 | C++ | Qt | Path traversal in file open | A Qt app opens a file from a user-supplied relative path. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-22 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | void open(QString p) {
QFile f("/data/" + p); // Vulnerable: traversal
f.open(QIODevice::ReadOnly);
} | void open(QString p) {
QFileInfo info(p);
if (info.isAbsolute() || p.contains("..")) return; // Secure
QFile f("/data/" + p);
f.open(QIODevice::ReadOnly);
} | --- a/open.cpp
+++ b/open.cpp
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
- QFile f("/data/" + p);
- f.open(QIODevice::ReadOnly);
+ QFileInfo info(p);
+ if (info.isAbsolute() || p.contains("..")) return;
+ QFile f("/data/" + p);
+ f.open(QIODevice::ReadOnly); | Unsanitized path. | p=../../etc/passwd reads file. | File disclosure. | Reject absolute/.. paths. | Confine file paths. | [
"path-traversal",
"cpp",
"qt",
"file-read"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000091 | Python | Django | Reusable token (no expiry) for password reset | A Django reset token never expires and is stored in plaintext, enabling reuse. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-640 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Intermediate | def issue_reset(user):
token = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
# Vulnerable: no expiry, plaintext store
Cache.set('reset:' + user.id, token)
return token
| def issue_reset(user):
token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
# Secure: hash + short TTL
Cache.set('reset:' + user.id, sha256(token), 900)
return token
| --- a/auth.py
+++ b/auth.py
@@ -2,5 +2,6 @@
- token = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
- Cache.set('reset:' + user.id, token)
+ token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+ Cache.set('reset:' + user.id, sha256(token), 900)
| Reset tokens lack expiry and are stored reversibly, allowing indefinite reuse. | Attacker who sees the token once can reset the password indefinitely. | Persistent account takeover. | Set short TTLs and store only token hashes; invalidate after use. | Reset tokens must expire and be single-use; store hashes only. | [
"fintech",
"django",
"python",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000434 | Java | Spring Boot | FHIR transaction without authz | Spring FHIR endpoint accepts bundle transactions without role check. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - BOLA | CWE-862 | T1190 | Critical | Advanced | @PostMapping("/fhir")
public Bundle transaction(@RequestBody Bundle b) {
return svc.process(b);
} | @PreAuthorize("hasRole('CLINICIAN')")
@PostMapping("/fhir")
public Bundle transaction(@RequestBody Bundle b) {
return svc.process(b);
} | --- a/FhirCtrl.java
+++ b/FhirCtrl.java
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+@PreAuthorize("hasRole('CLINICIAN')")
@PostMapping("/fhir")
public Bundle transaction(@RequestBody Bundle b) {
return svc.process(b);
} | No role on FHIR transaction. | Unauthenticated PHI mutation. | PHI breach. | Enforce clinician role. | Authorize FHIR writes. | [
"authorization",
"fhir",
"healthcare",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Healthcare",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000169 | Rust | Actix | Insecure direct object reference in API | An Actix handler returns a resource by id without owner check. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-639 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | async fn get(p: web::Path<String>, data: web::Data<Db>) -> impl Responder {
let r = data.get(&p.into_inner()); // Vulnerable: no owner
HttpResponse::Ok().json(r)
} | async fn get(u: AuthUser, p: web::Path<String>, data: web::Data<Db>) -> impl Responder {
let r = data.get_for(&u.id, &p.into_inner()); // Secure
match r { Some(x) => HttpResponse::Ok().json(x), None => HttpResponse::NotFound().finish() }
} | --- a/get.rs
+++ b/get.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-async fn get(p: web::Path<String>, data: web::Data<Db>) -> impl Responder {
- let r = data.get(&p.into_inner());
+async fn get(u: AuthUser, p: web::Path<String>, data: web::Data<Db>) -> impl Responder {
+ let r = data.get_for(&u.id, &p.into_inner()); | No ownership scoping on read. | Enumerator reads other users' records. | Cross-user disclosure. | Scope reads by owner. | Authorize reads by owner. | [
"idor",
"rust",
"actix",
"access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Healthcare",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000218 | Python | Django | Hardcoded secret key | A Django project hardcodes SECRET_KEY in settings. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | High | Beginner | SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-abc123" # Vulnerable | SECRET_KEY = os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"] # Secure: from env/secret | --- a/settings.py
+++ b/settings.py
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-abc123"
+SECRET_KEY = os.environ["DJANGO_SECRET_KEY"] | Secret in source. | Forge sessions/signed cookies. | Auth bypass. | Load from env/secret manager. | Externalize SECRET_KEY. | [
"secrets",
"django",
"python",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000337 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Weak password hashing (SHA1) | A service stores SHA1 password hashes without salt. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-916 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Beginner | var hash = SHA1.HashData(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(pw)); // Vulnerable: fast, unsalted\ | var hash = Rfc2898DeriveBytes.Pbkdf2(pw, salt, 100_000, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, 32); // Secure\ | --- a/Auth.cs\n+++ b/Auth.cs\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-var hash = SHA1.HashData(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(pw));\n+var hash = Rfc2898DeriveBytes.Pbkdf2(pw, salt, 100_000, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, 32);\ | SHA1 unsalted/fast. | Crack hashes. | Credential compromise. | Use PBKDF2/bcrypt/argon2. | Slow salted KDFs. | [
"crypto",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"passwords"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000049 | C# | ASP.NET Core | LDAP injection in directory lookup | An ASP.NET Core app builds an LDAP filter by concatenating user input. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-90 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Advanced | public SearchResponse Lookup(string user) {
// Vulnerable: input concatenated into filter
string filter = "(sAMAccountName=" + user + ")";
return _ldap.Search(filter);
}
| public SearchResponse Lookup(string user) {
// Secure: encode special chars, use parameterized filter builder
string safe = LdapEncoder.FilterEncode(user);
string filter = "(sAMAccountName=" + safe + ")";
return _ldap.Search(filter);
}
| --- a/LdapService.cs
+++ b/LdapService.cs
@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@
- string filter = "(sAMAccountName=" + user + ")";
+ string safe = LdapEncoder.FilterEncode(user);
+ string filter = "(sAMAccountName=" + safe + ")";
| Untrusted input is placed directly into an LDAP filter without encoding. | user = *)(|(objectClass=*)) bypasses the intended filter and returns all entries. | Authentication bypass or directory information disclosure. | Encode LDAP metacharacters (RFC 4515) before building filters. | Always encode LDAP filter special characters; prefer strongly typed queries. | [
"ldap-injection",
"aspnet",
"csharp",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000105 | C | Embedded | Lack of firmware signature verification | An IoT bootloader flashes any uploaded firmware without verifying a signature. | A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures | CWE-494 | T1195.002 - Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | Critical | Advanced | void flash(const uint8_t *img, size_t len) {
// Vulnerable: no signature check
write_to_flash(img, len);
}
| void flash(const uint8_t *img, size_t len) {
// Secure: verify ECDSA signature with root public key
if (!ecdsa_verify(ROOT_PUB, img, len - 64, img + len - 64))
return;
write_to_flash(img, len - 64);
}
| --- a/bootloader.c
+++ b/bootloader.c
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
- write_to_flash(img, len);
+ if (!ecdsa_verify(ROOT_PUB, img, len - 64, img + len - 64))
+ return;
+ write_to_flash(img, len - 64);
| Firmware is flashed without verifying a trusted signature, enabling malicious images. | Attacker uploads a trojaned firmware that persists on the device. | Persistent device compromise, botnet recruitment. | Verify firmware signatures (ECDSA) against a rooted public key before flashing. | Verify signed firmware; reject unsigned/modified images. | [
"iot",
"c",
"firmware",
"supply-chain"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "network",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000207 | TypeScript | NestJS | Hardcoded encryption key | A NestJS service uses a hardcoded AES key. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Beginner | const KEY = Buffer.from('aabbccddeeff0011', 'utf8'); // Vulnerable: hardcoded | const KEY = Buffer.from(process.env.AES_KEY!, 'hex'); // Secure: env | --- a/crypto.service.ts
+++ b/crypto.service.ts
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-const KEY = Buffer.from('aabbccddeeff0011', 'utf8');
+const KEY = Buffer.from(process.env.AES_KEY!, 'hex'); | Key in source. | Repo access reveals key; decrypt data. | Data decryption. | Load key from env/secret manager. | Externalize encryption keys. | [
"crypto",
"nestjs",
"typescript",
"secrets"
] | {
"domain": "Healthcare",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000272 | C++ | STD | Buffer overflow in strcpy | A C++ function copies with strcpy into a fixed buffer. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-120 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | High | Beginner | void copy(std::string in) {
char buf[32];
strcpy(buf, in.c_str()); // Vulnerable
} | void copy(std::string in) {
std::vector<char> buf(in.size() + 1); // Secure: sized
std::copy(in.begin(), in.end(), buf.begin());
buf[in.size()] = '00';
} | --- a/copy.cpp
+++ b/copy.cpp
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
- char buf[32];
- strcpy(buf, in.c_str());
+ std::vector<char> buf(in.size() + 1);
+ std::copy(in.begin(), in.end(), buf.begin());
+ buf[in.size()] = '00'; | Unbounded copy. | Long input overflows stack. | RCE. | Use std::string/vector. | Prefer std::string. | [
"buffer-overflow",
"cpp",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "argv",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000201 | JavaScript | Express | Insecure middleware order (helmet after routes) | An Express app registers security headers after routes, so they may be skipped. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-693 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Low | Beginner | app.get('/', (req,res)=>res.send('hi'));
app.use(helmet()); // Vulnerable: after route | app.use(helmet()); // Secure: before routes
app.get('/', (req,res)=>res.send('hi')); | --- a/app.js
+++ b/app.js
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-app.get('/', (req,res)=>res.send('hi'));
-app.use(helmet());
+app.use(helmet());
+app.get('/', (req,res)=>res.send('hi')); | Security middleware registered after routes. | Responses may lack headers. | Missing protections. | Register helmet first. | Register security middleware early. | [
"config",
"express",
"javascript",
"headers"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "middleware",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000063 | C | POSIX | Command injection via system() | A C program builds a shell command from user input and runs it via system(). | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-78 | T1059.004 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell | Critical | Beginner | #include <stdlib.h>
void run(const char *fname) {
// Vulnerable: input into shell
char cmd[256];
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "convert %s out.png", fname);
system(cmd);
}
| #include <spawn.h>
void run(const char *fname) {
// Secure: posix_spawn, no shell, validated name
if (strpbrk(fname, ";&|$\"'") != NULL) return;
char *argv[] = {"convert", (char *)fname, "out.png", NULL};
pid_t pid; posix_spawn(&pid, "/usr/bin/convert", NULL, NULL, argv, NULL);
}
| --- a/run.c
+++ b/run.c
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "convert %s out.png", fname);
- system(cmd);
+ if (strpbrk(fname, ";&|$\"'") != NULL) return;
+ char *argv[] = {"convert", (char *)fname, "out.png", NULL};
+ posix_spawn(&pid, "/usr/bin/convert", NULL, NULL, argv, NULL);
| User input is passed to a shell via system(), allowing metacharacter injection. | fname=x.png; rm -rf / runs arbitrary commands. | Remote code execution. | Avoid system(); use posix_spawn/execve with argument arrays and input validation. | No shell for untrusted input; validate and use exec-family calls. | [
"command-injection",
"c",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Serverless",
"input_source": "argv",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000122 | Rust | Actix | Unchecked panic on bad input (DoS) | An Actix handler unwraps user input, panicking on invalid data. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-248 | T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service | Low | Beginner | async fn parse(q: web::Query<Req>) -> impl Responder {
let n = q.into_inner().n.parse::<i32>().unwrap(); // Vulnerable
HttpResponse::Ok().json(n * 2)
} | async fn parse(q: web::Query<Req>) -> impl Responder {
match q.into_inner().n.parse::<i32>() {
Ok(n) => HttpResponse::Ok().json(n * 2),
Err(_) => HttpResponse::BadRequest().finish(), // Secure
}
} | --- a/parse.rs
+++ b/parse.rs
@@ -2,4 +2,7 @@
- let n = q.into_inner().n.parse::<i32>().unwrap();
- HttpResponse::Ok().json(n * 2)
+ match q.into_inner().n.parse::<i32>() {
+ Ok(n) => HttpResponse::Ok().json(n * 2),
+ Err(_) => HttpResponse::BadRequest().finish(),
+ } | Unwrap on untrusted parse panics the worker. | Send non-numeric input to crash the worker. | Denial of service. | Handle parse errors; return 400. | Never unwrap untrusted input; handle errors. | [
"dos",
"rust",
"actix",
"panic"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | |
SCP-000148 | C++ | STL | Double-free on error path | A C++ service frees a buffer on an error path that is also freed later. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-415 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | High | Advanced | char *buf = (char*)malloc(64);
if (err) { free(buf); return; } // Vulnerable: later also freed
use(buf);
free(buf); | std::vector<char> buf(64); // Secure: RAII, no manual free
if (err) return;
use(buf.data());
// vector freed automatically | --- a/proc.cpp
+++ b/proc.cpp
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
-char *buf = (char*)malloc(64);
-if (err) { free(buf); return; }
-use(buf);
-free(buf);
+std::vector<char> buf(64);
+if (err) return;
+use(buf.data()); | Manual free on two paths leads to double-free corruption. | Error path frees then normal path frees again; heap corruption. | Memory corruption, potential RCE. | Use RAII containers (vector/string); avoid manual free. | Prefer RAII; avoid manual malloc/free. | [
"double-free",
"cpp",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000147 | Scala | Play | Sensitive data logged in Play filter | A Play logging filter logs the full request body including passwords. | A09:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures | CWE-532 | T1562.001 - Impair Defenses | Medium | Beginner | override def apply(next: EssentialAction): EssentialAction = EssentialAction { req =>
logger.info(s"body=${req.body}") // Vulnerable
next(req)
} | val REDACT = Set("password","token","ssn")
override def apply(next: EssentialAction): EssentialAction = EssentialAction { req =>
val safe = req.body.map { case (k,v) => if (REDACT(k)) k -> "***" else k -> v } // Secure
logger.info(s"body=$safe")
next(req)
} | --- a/LoggingFilter.scala
+++ b/LoggingFilter.scala
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
- logger.info(s"body=${req.body}")
+ val safe = req.body.map { case (k,v) => if (REDACT(k)) k -> "***" else k -> v }
+ logger.info(s"body=$safe") | Full body with secrets is logged. | Log access exposes passwords. | Credential disclosure. | Redact sensitive fields before logging. | Redact secrets in logs. | [
"logging",
"play",
"scala",
"secrets"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000236 | Java | Spring Boot | Hardcoded API key in source | A Spring service hardcodes a third-party API key. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | High | Beginner | private static final String KEY = "sk_live_1a2b3c4d"; // Vulnerable | @Value("${PAYMENT_API_KEY}") // Secure: from env/secret
private String key; | --- a/Payment.java
+++ b/Payment.java
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-private static final String KEY = "sk_live_1a2b3c4d";
+@Value("${PAYMENT_API_KEY}")
+private String key; | Secret in source. | Repo access reveals the key. | Payment fraud. | Use env/secret manager. | Externalize secrets. | [
"secrets",
"spring",
"java",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000416 | YAML | Kubernetes | Privileged container in pod spec | A Kubernetes Pod runs a container with privileged: true. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-250 | T1611 - Escape to Host | Critical | Intermediate | containers:\n- name: app\n image: app:1.0\n securityContext:\n privileged: true # Vulnerable\ | containers:\n- name: app\n image: app:1.0\n securityContext:\n privileged: false # Secure: drop caps, readOnlyRootFilesystem\ | --- a/deploy.yaml\n+++ b/deploy.yaml\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n- securityContext:\n- privileged: true\n+ securityContext:\n+ privileged: false\ | Privileged container. | Escape to host via /dev access. | Host compromise. | Disable privileged; drop caps. | Least privilege containers. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"privilege",
"container"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000364 | PHP | Laravel | CORS allow-all with credentials | CORS config permits any origin with credentials. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-942 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Beginner | allowed_origins => [\'*\'], # Vulnerable + credentials | allowed_origins => [\ | --- a/config/cors.php\n+++ b/config/cors.php\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-allowed_origins => [\'*\'],\n+allowed_origins => [\ | Wildcard origin + credentials. | Cross-origin read with cookies. | Data theft. | Pin origins. | Restrict CORS. | [
"cors",
"php",
"laravel",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "header",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000453 | Rust | Actix | GraphQL query depth bomb | Actix GraphQL has no depth/complexity limit. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API4:2023 | CWE-400 | T1499 | Medium | Intermediate | Schema::build(Query, EmptyMutation, EmptySubscription).finish() | let schema = Schema::build(...).finish();
// reject queries exceeding depth 10 / complexity 1000 | --- a/graphql.rs
+++ b/graphql.rs
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-Schema::build(Query, EmptyMutation, EmptySubscription).finish()
+let schema = Schema::build(...).finish();
+// reject queries exceeding depth 10 / complexity 1000 | No query depth limit. | Nested query exhausts CPU. | DoS. | Enforce depth/complexity. | Limit GraphQL query depth. | [
"graphql",
"actix",
"rust",
"dos"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000307 | Go | Gin | Command injection via exec.Command | A Gin handler passes user input to a shell. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-78 | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | High | Intermediate | out, _ := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "ping -c1 "+host).Output() // Vulnerable | if !validHost(host) { c.AbortWithStatus(400); return }
out, _ := exec.Command("ping", "-c1", host).Output() // Secure: arg array | --- a/ping.go
+++ b/ping.go
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-out, _ := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "ping -c1 "+host).Output()
+if !validHost(host) { c.AbortWithStatus(400); return }
+out, _ := exec.Command("ping", "-c1", host).Output() | Shell with user input. | host=;cat /etc/passwd executes. | Command injection. | Validate + arg array. | Avoid shell. | [
"command-injection",
"go",
"gin",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000125 | JavaScript | Express | Insecure crypto with MD5 for tokens | An Express service hashes tokens with MD5, enabling collision/brute force. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-327 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Intermediate | const crypto = require('crypto');
function hash(t){ return crypto.createHash('md5').update(t).digest('hex'); } // Vulnerable | const crypto = require('crypto');
function hash(t){ return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(t).digest('hex'); } // Secure
function token(){ return crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'); } | --- a/crypto.js
+++ b/crypto.js
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
- return crypto.createHash('md5').update(t).digest('hex');
+ return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(t).digest('hex'); | MD5 is broken; tokens are guessable/collidable. | Attacker forges tokens via collision or brute force. | Token forgery, account takeover. | Use SHA-256 (or better) and CSPRNG tokens. | Avoid MD5/SHA1; use SHA-256+ and randomBytes. | [
"crypto",
"express",
"javascript",
"weak-hash"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000172 | Go | gRPC | gRPC message without auth metadata | A gRPC stream accepts calls without checking auth metadata. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-306 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Intermediate | func (s *S) Stream(srv pb.Svc_StreamServer) error {
for { srv.Recv() } // Vulnerable: no auth
} | func (s *S) Stream(srv pb.Svc_StreamServer) error {
md, _ := metadata.FromIncomingContext(srv.Context())
if md.Get("authorization") == nil { return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "no auth") } // Secure
for { srv.Recv() }
} | --- a/server.go
+++ b/server.go
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
- for { srv.Recv() }
+ md,_ := metadata.FromIncomingContext(srv.Context())
+ if md.Get("authorization") == nil { return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated,"no auth") }
+ for { srv.Recv() } | Stream lacks auth metadata check. | Unauthenticated client streams data. | Unauthorized access. | Verify auth metadata on every stream. | Authenticate gRPC streams. | [
"grpc",
"go",
"auth",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "rpc",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000352 | PHP | Laravel | No rate limit on login | A login route has no throttling. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-307 | T1110 - Brute Force | Medium | Beginner | Route::post("/login", [Auth::class, "login"]); // Vulnerable: no throttle\ | Route::post("/login", [Auth::class, "login"])->middleware("throttle:5,1"); // Secure\ | --- a/routes/web.php\n+++ b/routes/web.php\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-Route::post("/login", [Auth::class, "login"]);\n+Route::post("/login", [Auth::class, "login"])->middleware("throttle:5,1");\ | No throttle on auth. | Brute force credentials. | Account takeover. | Throttle login. | Rate limit auth. | [
"rate-limiting",
"php",
"laravel",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000061 | C | POSIX | Buffer overflow via gets() | A C program reads input with gets(), writing past the stack buffer. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-120 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | Critical | Intermediate | #include <stdio.h>
int main(void) {
char buf[32];
// Vulnerable: unbounded read into fixed buffer
gets(buf);
printf("hello %s\n", buf);
return 0;
}
| #include <stdio.h>
int main(void) {
char buf[32];
// Secure: bounded read
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) return 1;
printf("hello %s", buf);
return 0;
}
| --- a/main.c
+++ b/main.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
- gets(buf);
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) return 1;
| gets() performs no bounds checking, allowing a stack buffer overflow. | Long input overwrites the return address, redirecting execution to shellcode. | Memory corruption, remote/local code execution. | Use fgets/scanf with explicit bounds; enable stack protections. | Never use gets(); bound all input reads; compile with -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE. | [
"buffer-overflow",
"c",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "stdin",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000132 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Open redirect via ReturnUrl | An ASP.NET Core login returns to an unvalidated ReturnUrl. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | public IActionResult Login(string returnUrl) {
// Vulnerable
return Redirect(returnUrl);
} | public IActionResult Login(string returnUrl) {
if (!Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl)) returnUrl = "/"; // Secure
return Redirect(returnUrl);
} | --- a/AccountController.cs
+++ b/AccountController.cs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
- return Redirect(returnUrl);
+ if (!Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl)) returnUrl = "/";
+ return Redirect(returnUrl); | Unvalidated redirect target. | returnUrl=//evil.com phishing. | Phishing. | Use Url.IsLocalUrl to constrain to same host. | Validate ReturnUrl with IsLocalUrl. | [
"open-redirect",
"aspnet",
"csharp",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000258 | C | POSIX | Use-after-free | A C program dereferences memory after free. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-416 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | High | Advanced | void proc() {
int *p = malloc(8); *p = 1;
free(p);
*p = 2; // Vulnerable: use-after-free
} | void proc() {
int *p = malloc(8); *p = 1;
free(p); p = NULL; // Secure: null after free
if (p) *p = 2;
} | --- a/proc.c
+++ b/proc.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
- free(p);
- *p = 2;
+ free(p); p = NULL;
+ if (p) *p = 2; | Deref after free. | Heap spray / type confusion. | Memory corruption. | Null pointers after free. | Set freed pointers to NULL. | [
"use-after-free",
"c",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "internal",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000280 | C++ | STD | Uninitialized variable use | A C++ function uses a variable before initialization. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-457 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | Medium | Beginner | int compute(int x) {
int r; // Vulnerable: uninitialized
if (x > 0) r = x * 2;
return r; // may be garbage
} | int compute(int x) {
int r = 0; // Secure: initialize
if (x > 0) r = x * 2;
return r;
} | --- a/compute.cpp
+++ b/compute.cpp
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-int r; // Vulnerable: uninitialized
+int r = 0; // Secure: initialize
if (x > 0) r = x * 2; | Use before init. | Read uninitialized stack data. | Info leak / bug. | Initialize variables. | Always initialize. | [
"uninitialized",
"cpp",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "internal",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000231 | Java | Spring Boot | SQL injection via concatenated PreparedStatement | A Spring repository builds a PreparedStatement query by string concatenation. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | String sql = "SELECT * FROM u WHERE name='" + name + "'";
PreparedStatement ps = c.prepareStatement(sql); // Vulnerable | String sql = "SELECT * FROM u WHERE name = ?";
PreparedStatement ps = c.prepareStatement(sql);
ps.setString(1, name); // Secure | --- a/Repo.java
+++ b/Repo.java
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-String sql = "SELECT * FROM u WHERE name='" + name + "'";
-PreparedStatement ps = c.prepareStatement(sql);
+String sql = "SELECT * FROM u WHERE name = ?";
+PreparedStatement ps = c.prepareStatement(sql);
+ps.setString(1, name); | Query string built by concatenation then prepared. | name=' OR '1'='1 bypasses auth. | Data disclosure. | Use bound parameters only. | Always bind parameters; never concat into SQL. | [
"sqli",
"spring",
"java",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000009 | Java | Spring Boot | SQL injection in Spring Data JPA native query | A Spring repository uses a concatenated native query with a request parameter. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | @Repository
public class UserRepository {
@Autowired
private JdbcTemplate jdbc;
public List<Map<String,Object>> search(String term) {
// Vulnerable: string concatenation
String sql = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE '%" + term + "%'";
return jdbc.queryForList(sql);
}
}
| @Repository
public class UserRepository {
@Autowired
private JdbcTemplate jdbc;
public List<Map<String,Object>> search(String term) {
// Secure: named parameter binding
return jdbc.queryForList(
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE :term",
Map.of("term", "%" + term +... | --- a/UserRepository.java
+++ b/UserRepository.java
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
- String sql = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE '%" + term + "%'";
- return jdbc.queryForList(sql);
+ return jdbc.queryForList("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE :term",
+ Map.of("term", "%" + term + "%"));
| Unvalidated input is concatenated into a SQL string rather than bound as a parameter. | term = %' UNION SELECT card_number, cvv FROM cards -- extracts sensitive columns. | Data exfiltration from arbitrary tables. | Use parameterized queries (named parameters or PreparedStatement). | Never concatenate SQL. Use JPA derived queries or bound parameters. | [
"sqli",
"spring",
"java",
"jdbc"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000356 | PHP | Laravel | Weak password hashing (MD5) | A Laravel app stores MD5 password hashes. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-916 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Beginner | $hash = md5($password); // Vulnerable: fast, unsalted\ | $hash = password_hash($password, PASSWORD_BCRYPT, ["cost" => 12]); // Secure: salted\ | --- a/Auth.php\n+++ b/Auth.php\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-$hash = md5($password);\n+$hash = password_hash($password, PASSWORD_BCRYPT, ["cost" => 12]);\ | MD5 unsalted/fast. | Crack hashes. | Credential compromise. | Use password_hash. | Slow salted KDFs. | [
"crypto",
"php",
"laravel",
"passwords"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000018 | JavaScript | NestJS | CSRF on state-changing endpoint | A NestJS controller mutates state with no CSRF protection on cookie-auth sessions. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-352 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | @Controller('transfer')
export class TransferController {
@Post()
transfer(@Body() body, @Req() req) {
// Vulnerable: relies only on session cookie, no CSRF token
return this.bank.transfer(req.user.id, body.to, body.amount);
}
}
| @Controller('transfer')
@UseGuards(CsrfGuard)
export class TransferController {
@Post()
@UseInterceptors(ValidateBodyInterceptor)
transfer(@Body() body: TransferDto, @Req() req) {
return this.bank.transfer(req.user.id, body.to, body.amount);
}
}
// CsrfGuard verifies the synchronizer token / double-submit ... | --- a/transfer.controller.ts
+++ b/transfer.controller.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
+@UseGuards(CsrfGuard)
export class TransferController {
@Post()
+ @UseInterceptors(ValidateBodyInterceptor)
| State-changing requests are authenticated by a cookie alone, so forged cross-site requests succeed. | A malicious page auto-submits a transfer form in the victim's authenticated session. | Unauthorized state changes (money transfer, settings change) as the victim. | Enforce CSRF tokens (synchronizer pattern or double-submit cookie) on all state-changing routes. | Protect cookie-authenticated state changes with anti-CSRF tokens and SameSite cookies. | [
"csrf",
"nestjs",
"typescript",
"banking"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000262 | C | POSIX | Insecure temporary file | A C program creates a temp file with a predictable name. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-377 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | void save(char *d) {
int fd = open("/tmp/data.txt", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0644); // Vulnerable: predictable
write(fd, d, strlen(d));
} | void save(char *d) {
char tmpl[] = "/tmp/dataXXXXXX";
int fd = mkstemp(tmpl); // Secure: unpredictable
write(fd, d, strlen(d));
} | --- a/save.c
+++ b/save.c
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
- int fd = open("/tmp/data.txt", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0644);
+ char tmpl[] = "/tmp/dataXXXXXX";
+ int fd = mkstemp(tmpl);
write(fd, d, strlen(d)); | Predictable temp file name. | Symlink / pre-create the file. | File tampering. | Use mkstemp. | Use mkstemp for temp files. | [
"temp-file",
"c",
"file-write"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "internal",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000462 | Python | Django | SSRF in image proxy | Django view fetches remote image by URL. | A10:2021 - SSRF | CWE-918 | T1190 | High | Intermediate | def proxy(request):
return HttpResponse(requests.get(request.GET["u"]).content) | def proxy(request):
u = urlparse(request.GET["u"])
if u.scheme != "https" or u.hostname not in ALLOWED:
return HttpResponseForbidden()
return HttpResponse(requests.get(request.GET["u"]).content) | --- a/proxy.py
+++ b/proxy.py
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-def proxy(request):
- return HttpResponse(requests.get(request.GET["u"]).content)
+def proxy(request):
+ u = urlparse(request.GET["u"])
+ if u.scheme != "https" or u.hostname not in ALLOWED:
+ return HttpResponseForbidden() | Unvalidated fetch URL. | Fetch internal services. | Metadata theft. | Allowlist schemes/hosts. | Validate fetch targets. | [
"ssrf",
"django",
"python",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Cloud",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000372 | Rust | Actix | No rate limit on login | A login route has no throttling. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-307 | T1110 - Brute Force | Medium | Beginner | .route("/login", web::post().to(login)) // Vulnerable: no throttle\ | .route("/login", web::post().to(login)).wrap(RateLimiter::new(5, 60)) // Secure\ | --- a/routes.rs\n+++ b/routes.rs\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-.route("/login", web::post().to(login))\n+.route("/login", web::post().to(login)).wrap(RateLimiter::new(5, 60))\ | No throttle on auth. | Brute force credentials. | Account takeover. | Rate limit login. | Throttle auth endpoints. | [
"rate-limiting",
"rust",
"actix",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000393 | Kotlin | Android | Path traversal in file provider | A FileProvider path can be traversed via intent. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-22 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | val f = File(baseDir, intent.getStringExtra("name")) // Vulnerable: traversal\ | val name = File(intent.getStringExtra("name") ?: "").name // Secure: basename\nval f = File(baseDir, name)\ | --- a/FileProvider.kt\n+++ b/FileProvider.kt\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-val f = File(baseDir, intent.getStringExtra("name"))\n+val name = File(intent.getStringExtra("name") ?: "").name\n+val f = File(baseDir, name)\ | Unsanitized filename. | name=../../etc/hosts reads file. | File disclosure. | Basename + confine. | Confine file paths. | [
"path-traversal",
"kotlin",
"android",
"file-read"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "intent",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000019 | TypeScript | Next.js | Server action exposes internal env via error leak | A Next.js server action returns raw exception messages including secrets/stack to the client. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-209 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | 'use server';
export async function subscribe(email: string) {
try {
await db.insert(email, process.env.API_KEY!);
} catch (e) {
// Vulnerable: leaks internals to client
return { error: String(e) };
}
}
| 'use server';
export async function subscribe(email: string) {
try {
await db.insert(email);
} catch (e) {
console.error('subscribe failed', e); // server-only log
return { error: 'subscription failed, try again later' };
}
}
| --- a/actions.ts
+++ b/actions.ts
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
- return { error: String(e) };
+ console.error('subscribe failed', e);
+ return { error: 'subscription failed, try again later' };
| Detailed internal errors (with secrets/stack traces) are returned to the client. | Trigger an error and read the response to learn internal paths, keys, or DB structure. | Information disclosure aiding further attacks. | Return generic client messages; log details server-side only. | Never leak raw exceptions to clients; log server-side and return safe messages. | [
"info-leak",
"nextjs",
"typescript",
"error-handling"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000446 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Open redirect | ReturnUrl param used directly in a redirect. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 | Medium | Beginner | return LocalRedirect(returnUrl); // not local | if (Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl))
return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
return RedirectToAction("Index"); | --- a/AccountController.cs
+++ b/AccountController.cs
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
+if (Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl))
+ return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
+return RedirectToAction("Index"); | Unvalidated redirect. | returnUrl=//evil.com phishing. | Phishing. | Use IsLocalUrl. | Validate redirects. | [
"open-redirect",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000422 | YAML | Kubernetes | Allow privilege escalation (allowPrivilegeEscalation) | A container sets allowPrivilegeEscalation: true. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-250 | T1611 - Escape to Host | High | Beginner | securityContext:\n allowPrivilegeEscalation: true # Vulnerable\ | securityContext:\n allowPrivilegeEscalation: false # Secure\n readOnlyRootFilesystem: true\ | --- a/deploy.yaml\n+++ b/deploy.yaml\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-securityContext:\n allowPrivilegeEscalation: true\n+securityContext:\n+ allowPrivilegeEscalation: false\n+ readOnlyRootFilesystem: true\ | Privilege escalation allowed. | SUID binary gains root. | Container root. | Set false. | Disallow escalation. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"privilege",
"container"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000264 | C | POSIX | Null pointer dereference | A C function dereferences a pointer that may be NULL. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-476 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | Medium | Beginner | void show(User *u) {
printf("%s\n", u->name); // Vulnerable: u may be NULL
} | void show(User *u) {
if (!u) return; // Secure: NULL check
printf("%s\n", u->name);
} | --- a/show.c
+++ b/show.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
- printf("%s\n", u->name);
+ if (!u) return;
+ printf("%s\n", u->name); | Missing NULL check. | Pass NULL to crash service. | DoS. | Check pointers before deref. | Null-check inputs. | [
"null-deref",
"c",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "argv",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000321 | Go | Gin | Race condition on balance update | A Go handler updates a balance without locking. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-362 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Advanced | acc.Balance -= amount // Vulnerable: data race (concurrent requests) | acc.mu.Lock(); defer acc.mu.Unlock()
if acc.Balance < amount { return errInsufficient }
acc.Balance -= amount // Secure: locked | --- a/account.go
+++ b/account.go
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-acc.Balance -= amount
+acc.mu.Lock(); defer acc.mu.Unlock()
+if acc.Balance < amount { return errInsufficient }
+acc.Balance -= amount | Unlocked shared mutation. | Double-spend via concurrent requests. | Financial loss. | Use mutex/atomic. | Protect shared state. | [
"race-condition",
"go",
"gin",
"concurrency"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000142 | Rust | Actix | SQL injection in raw SQL build | An Actix handler builds SQL by formatting user input into the string. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | async fn find(q: web::Query<Q>) -> impl Responder {
let sql = format!("SELECT * FROM t WHERE name='{}'", q.name); // Vulnerable
query(&sql)
} | async fn find(q: web::Query<Q>) -> impl Responder {
let rows = sqlx::query("SELECT * FROM t WHERE name = $1") // Secure
.bind(&q.name).fetch_all(&pool).await?;
HttpResponse::Ok().json(rows)
} | --- a/find.rs
+++ b/find.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
- let sql = format!("SELECT * FROM t WHERE name='{}'", q.name);
- query(&sql)
+ let rows = sqlx::query("SELECT * FROM t WHERE name = $1")
+ .bind(&q.name).fetch_all(&pool).await?;
+ HttpResponse::Ok().json(rows) | Format! into SQL string. | name=' OR '1'='1 dumps data. | Data disclosure. | Use parameterized queries (sqlx). | Parameterize all SQL in Rust with sqlx. | [
"sqli",
"rust",
"actix",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000413 | Swift | iOS | Insecure file upload (no type check) | An upload sends any file type by name. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | CWE-434 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | try Data(contentsOf: fileURL) // Vulnerable: any type uploaded\ | guard fileURL.pathExtension == "png" || fileURL.pathExtension == "jpg" else { throw Error.bad } // Secure\nlet data = try Data(contentsOf: fileURL)\ | --- a/Upload.swift\n+++ b/Upload.swift\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-try Data(contentsOf: fileURL)\n+guard fileURL.pathExtension == "png" || fileURL.pathExtension == "jpg" else { throw Error.bad }\n+let data = try Data(contentsOf: fileURL)\ | No type validation. | Upload malicious file. | Abuse. | Allowlist types. | Validate uploads. | [
"file-upload",
"swift",
"ios",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000385 | Rust | Actix | Verbose error in response | A handler returns raw error strings to the client. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-209 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Low | Beginner | HttpResponse::InternalServerError().body(format!("err: {}", e)) // Vulnerable: leaks\ | log::error!("err: {}", e);\nHttpResponse::InternalServerError().body("internal_error") // Secure\ | --- a/handler.rs\n+++ b/handler.rs\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-HttpResponse::InternalServerError().body(format!("err: {}", e))\n+log::error!("err: {}", e);\n+HttpResponse::InternalServerError().body("internal_error")\ | Raw error to client. | Extract internal details. | Info disclosure. | Generic error to client. | Log detailed, return generic. | [
"info-leak",
"rust",
"actix",
"error-handling"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000174 | Python | FastAPI | JWT lacking audience check | A FastAPI verifier ignores the aud claim, accepting tokens for other services. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-345 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Intermediate | def verify(t):
return jwt.decode(t, KEY, algorithms=['HS256']) # Vulnerable: no aud | def verify(t):
return jwt.decode(t, KEY, algorithms=['HS256'], audience='orders-svc') # Secure | --- a/auth.py
+++ b/auth.py
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
- return jwt.decode(t, KEY, algorithms=['HS256'])
+ return jwt.decode(t, KEY, algorithms=['HS256'], audience='orders-svc') | No audience validation lets a token for service A be used at service B. | Attacker replays a token minted for another audience. | Cross-service auth bypass. | Validate the aud claim. | Always check JWT audience. | [
"jwt",
"fastapi",
"python",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "header",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000330 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Hardcoded connection string | An appsettings.json contains a plaintext DB password. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | High | Beginner | "ConnectionStrings": { "Default": "Server=db;User=sa;Password=P@ssw0rd!" } // Vulnerable\ | "ConnectionStrings": { "Default": "%DB_CONN%" } // Secure: from env/secret\ | --- a/appsettings.json\n+++ b/appsettings.json\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-"ConnectionStrings": { "Default": "Server=db;User=sa;Password=P@ssw0rd!" }\n+"ConnectionStrings": { "Default": "%DB_CONN%" }\ | Secret in config. | Read config for DB creds. | DB compromise. | Externalize secrets. | Use secret manager. | [
"secrets",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000116 | Go | Gin | Verbose panic stack in response | A Gin handler recovers a panic and writes the stack to the response. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-209 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Low | Beginner | func handler(c *gin.Context) {
defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil {
c.String(500, "%v", r) // Vulnerable: stack to client
} }()
panic("db down")
} | func handler(c *gin.Context) {
defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil {
log.Printf("panic: %v", r) // Secure: server log only
c.String(500, "internal error")
} }()
panic("db down")
} | --- a/handler.go
+++ b/handler.go
@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@
- c.String(500, "%v", r)
+ log.Printf("panic: %v", r)
+ c.String(500, "internal error") | Panic details returned to client. | Trigger panic to map internals. | Information disclosure. | Log panics; return generic message. | Never expose stack traces to clients. | [
"info-leak",
"gin",
"go",
"error"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000351 | PHP | Laravel | XSS via echoed request input | A Blade view echoes input without escaping. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-79 | T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Medium | Beginner | <div>{!! $comment !!}</div> <!-- Vulnerable: unescaped -->\ | <div>{{ $comment }}</div> <!-- Secure: escaped -->\ | --- a/show.blade.php\n+++ b/show.blade.php\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-<div>{!! $comment !!}</div>\n+<div>{{ $comment }}</div>\ | {!! !!} disables escaping. | comment=<script>steal()</script> runs. | XSS. | Use {{ }} escaping. | Avoid {!! !!} on user input. | [
"xss",
"php",
"laravel",
"template"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "db",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N |
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