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33.528 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Policy Control Function (PCF) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.528/33528-j00.zip | |
33.529 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF) network product class | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.529/33529-j10.zip | The present document contains objectives, security assurance requirements and test cases specific to the SMSF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements. It formulates specific adaptations of the requirements and test cases given in the catalogue. It also specifies requirements derived from other technical specifications and test cases unique to the SMSF network product class. |
33.530 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.530/33530-j00.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UDR network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements [2] and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the UDR network product class. |
33.533 | Security aspects of ranging based services and sidelink positioning | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.533/33533-j00.zip | |
33.535 | Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (5GS) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.535/33535-j00.zip | |
33.536 | Security aspects of 3GPP support for advanced Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.536/33536-j00.zip | |
33.537 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function (AAnF) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.537/33537-j00.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the AAnF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AAnF network product class. |
33.545 | Security aspects of NR Femto | TS | 19.3.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.545/33545-j30.zip | |
33.558 | Security aspects of enhancement of support for enabling edge applications | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.558/33558-j00.zip | The present document specifies the security features and mechanisms to support the application architecture for enabling Edge Applications in 5G, i.e. security for the interfaces, procedures for the authentication and authorization between the entities of the application architecture, and procedures for the EES capability exposure. |
33.700-22 | Study on security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) Phase3 | TR | 19.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-22/33700-22-j20.zip | |
33.700-29 | Study on security aspects of 5G satellite access in the 5G architecture phase 3 | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-29/33700-29-j10.zip | The present document studies the security and privacy aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3. It is comprised of the following parts:
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of the regenerative payload generic architecture in 5GS/EPS.
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of the Store and Forward (S&F) Satellite operation both for NR NTN (5GS) and for IoT NTN (EPS).
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of UE-Satellite-UE communication enhancements for 5GS.
- The impact on regulatory services in the context of 5G satellite access. In particular, the assessment of the potential impact to lawful intercept in regenerative, Store and Forward (S&F), and UE-satellite-UE communication enhancement architecture. |
33.700-32 | Study on security aspects of user identities and authentication | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-32/33700-32-j10.zip | The present document studies the security and privacy aspects for the creation and usage of user identities as studied in 3GPP TR 23.700-32 [2], with the following focus:
1) Study authentication and authorization of:
a) a user identifier associated with a subscription and used on a UE (i.e., human user) and
b) an identifier associated with a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG.
2) Study privacy and security impacts of usage of user identifiers associated with a subscription or with a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG, including exposure of user profile related information. |
33.700-41 | Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256bits | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-41/33700-41-j00.zip | The present document aims to address key requirements for introducing support for 256-bit symmetric algorithms into the 5G System as well as the coexistence of 128-bit and 256-bit cryptographic algorithms. Considering findings and conclusions from preceding work, the following points should be addressed as part of the present document:
Studying key issues and candidate solutions concerning the negotiation (selection) of key sizes between UE and network, including:
- Potential risks and impacts to the current system when supporting both 128-bit and 256-bit algorithms in parallel and the adoption of 256-bit algorithms in existing deployments where 128 bits is already supported, e.g. handover scenarios within 5G system.
- How to prioritise the use of 256-bit algorithms and mitigate bidding-down attacks when negotiating key sizes.
- How to ensure 256-bit security is achieved concerning varying levels of support for 256-bit algorithms by different UEs and within the network; potential dependencies in key-length selection of AS and NAS layers.
- Study the implications and requirements for the key hierarchies to support 256-bit cryptographic algorithms.
- Study the implications and requirements to AKA procedures. |
33.701 | Study on mitigations against bidding down Attacks | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.701/33701-j00.zip | The present document focuses on mitigating bidding down attack, i.e. how to prevent UEs that are currently connected to LTE/5G from establishing a connection with a GERAN/UTRAN FBS considering for example the decommissioning of GERAN and UTRAN networks. In particular, the present document aims at:
- Identifying attack scenarios and threats in the context of decommissioning of GERAN and UTRAN networks, e.g. cell (re)selection or forced handovers on GERAN or UTRAN once LTE and 5G signalling are blocked when GERAN/UTRAN networks are decommissioned; and
- Documenting solutions for the identified security threats and requirements. |
33.702 | Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.702/33702-j00.zip | The following objectives are studied in the present document:
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support UE connecting to a new target TNAP within the same TNGF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support AUN3 connecting to a new target RG under the same WAGF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support N5CW devices connecting to a new target Trusted WLAN AP within the same TWIF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support UE connecting to a new WLAN AP that shares the same NSWOF without performing full authentication.
The present document does not cover actual mobility, where call/session continuity is maintained. I.e. when UE/device is moving from one AP/TNAP/TWAP to another, connectivity can break, and then UE will reconnect. |
33.713 | Study on security aspects of Ambient Internet of Things (AIoT) Services in 5G | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.713/33713-j00.zip | |
33.721 | Study on security aspects of 5G mobile metaverse services | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.721/33721-j10.zip | |
33.727 | Lawful Intercept Handling of Protected Services | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.727/33727-001.zip | Offering communication services with end-to-end (E2E) cryptographic protection is becoming more desirable and more common. 3GPP-defined services (such as those of the IMS framework) have so far largely relied on trustworthy network infrastructure, complemented by strong cryptographic access security and hop-by-hop protection in the core and service domains. However, also here, E2E protected services are gaining attractivity. Indeed, the solution defined in TS 33.535, Authentication and Key Management for Applications based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (AKMA), can be leveraged as a basis for protecting basically any IP-based service provided to a UE (an ME with USIM-credentials). While this trend is both natural and desirable from a user privacy point of view, it creates problems related to regulatory obligations for CSPs to provide Lawful Interception (LI). The problems are particularly emphasised in roaming scenarios, where each of two different CSPs in distinct jurisdictions might independently need to provide LI without reliance on co-operation by the other CSP and/or law enforcement in the other jurisdiction.
The currently dominant approach to tackle these issues has been to simply not activate the protection (encryption) when it potentially conflicts with LI requirements. Going forward, this is most likely not a sustainable solution. For example, it potentially exposes the traffic to any 3rd party and, moreover, it typically also results in data integrity being disabled, while the issues are predominantly tied to data confidentiality.
The present document provides a technical study on how to enable protected services without negative consequences for LI. The CSP’s LI obligation to provide communication with the encryption removed only applies when the CSP also provides the technical means enabling the protection (e.g. key management), and therefore the scope is limited to that use case. |
33.743 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity-based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) phase 3 | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.743/33743-j00.zip | The present document investigates and identifies the security (including privacy) threats, corresponding security (including privacy) requirements and potential solutions for Proximity Based Services (ProSe) in 5G System (5GS) phase 3, based on the architecture and system level enhancements studied in TR 23.700-03 [1], including
- ProSe multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay (both Layer-2 and Layer-3 Relays).
- ProSe multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay (Layer-3 Relay only). |
33.745 | Study on security aspects of 5G Next Radio (NR) Femto | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.745/33745-j10.zip | The present document studies the potential security enhancements for supporting 5G NR Femto. More specifically, the study investigates potential security enhancements in the following areas:
- With the gap analysis, study the potential updates or enhancements needed for 5G NR Femto over TS 33.320[2].
- Study the security impacts for interworking between CAG and CSG cells.
- Study the security impacts of enabling provisioning of subscribers allowed to access 5G NR Femto cells and how to manage 5G NR Femto access control by the Closed Access Group (CAG) owner or an authorized administrator. |
33.749 | Study on security aspects of enhancement of support for edge computing in the 5G Core (5GC) phase 3 | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.749/33749-j00.zip | The present document studies the security enhancements on the support for Edge Computing in the 5G Core network defined in TR 23.700-49 [2], and enhanced architecture for enabling Edge Applications defined in TS 23.558 [3]. Specifically, the present document focuses on the following:
1) Study the security aspects on the enhancements for EAS (re)discovery and UPF (re)selection with reducing impact on central 5GC NFs, enhancement of EAS and local UPF (re)selection, and EC Traffic Routing between local part of DN and central part of DN the Edge Hosting Environment information management.
2) Study the security on the enhancements to Edge Enabler layer (EEL) to support additional scenarios for edge services.
3) Study the authorization between EESes for both Application Context Relocation (ACR) and Edge Node Sharing (ENS) scenarios.
4) Study the secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information in the EDGE.
The study is based on the work done in the TS 33.558 [4], TR 33.839 [5], TR 33.739 [6]. |
33.754 | Study on security aspects for multi-access(DualSteer +Access Traffic Steering, Switch and Splitting support in the 5G system architecture phase 4 (ATSSS Ph-4) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.754/33754-j00.zip | The present document aims to address the security aspects of Multi-Access, focusing on DualSteer devices and ATSSS Phase 4 (ATSSS Ph-4) enhancements, as identified in the FS_MASSS study in TR 23.700-54 [2].
The scope of this study includes the following key areas:
- Examine the security implications of a simplified architecture over non-3GPP access, where non-3GPP access does not rely on the current TNGF/N3IWF architecture. This involves assessing:
- Whether to keep NAS security context on non-3GPP access.
- Whether to keep IPsec on the user plane and/or control plane of non-3GPP access.
- Whether new security mechanisms are to be considered in UE procedures, particularly regarding registration and connectivity to the 5G system in the context of ATSSS between 3GPP and non-3GPP access without 5G NAS.
The present document leverages insights from the requirements and architectural considerations outlined in the TR 23.700-54 [2]. |
33.757 | Study on security for a PLMN hosting a Non-Public Network (NPN) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.757/33757-j00.zip | The present document studies the security when a PLMN hosts an NPN with dedicated NFs deployed in the customer domain. A NPN customer may deploy on-premises NFs, or hosted NFs which reside in third-party premises, or both. A PLMN hosting an NPN is an example of a Public Network Integrated NPN (PNI-NPN). The term PNI-NPN applies to this study of a PLMN hosting an NPN.
More specifically, the present document:
- identifies key issues and potential security requirements for the scenarios of PLMN hosting an NPN with dedicated NFs deployed in the customer domain. Related dedicated NFs may be described in the key issues.
- when necessary, develops solutions to address the identified requirements. |
33.759 | Study on security enhancements of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) Phase 3 | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.759/33759-j00.zip | The present document identifies potential security and privacy issues and provides potential security solutions to support additional scenarios and requirements for UAV (Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle) and UAM (Urban Air Mobility) including:
- identify potential security issues and provide solutions for the enhanced NEF services to support service exposure and interactions between MNOs and UTM functions, e.g. security impact of supporting multiple USS.
- identify potential security and privacy issues related to network-assisted/ground-based mechanism for DAA (Detect And Avoid).
- identify potential security and privacy issues related to no-transmit zones for UAVs
Furthermore, the present document makes potential recommendations for possible normative work taking into consideration the conclusions of TR 23.700-59 [2]. |
33.766 | Study on security aspects of energy savings in 5G | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.766/33766-j00.zip | The present document studies the security and privacy aspects of energy savings. More especially the document:
- Identifies key issues concerning the privacy and security aspects of collecting energy related information.
- Identifies key issues concerning the privacy and security impacts of exposure of energy related information.
- If required, develops solutions addressing the identified key issues. |
33.776 | Study of Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.776/33776-j00.zip | The scope of this document is to identify key issues and study solutions addressed using ACME for automated certificate management in SBA.
Areas of study include:
- Automated certificate management protocol and procedures for certificate life cycle events (i.e., enrolment, renewal, and revocation) within 5G SBA (i.e., to be used by operator CAs and all 5GC NFs including NRF, SCP, SEPP, etc.), including the following:
- ACME transport and request/response messages for 5G SBA use cases
- ACME certificate profiles for all 5G SBA entities
- Mechanisms for establishing initial trust and chain of trust of Certificate Authority hierarchies, including the following:
- Existing ACME challenge types and if any new challenge types are needed for 3GPP use cases:
- Creation, deletion, rotation, revocation and storage of the certificates
- Ability to automate ACME challenge validation
- Suitability of existing mechanisms when 5G SBA is for standalone NPN (SNPN)
- Call flow of the messages exchanged between different entities in the chain of trust.
NOTE: Certificate management for the external interface of the SEPP is out of scope. |
33.784 | Study on security aspects of core network enhanced support for Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.784/33784-j00.zip | The present document studies the security aspects of enablers for network automation for the 5G system based on the outcome of TR 38.843[2] and TR 23.700-84[3]. More specifically, this document identifies security issues and requirements and provides corresponding security solutions related to the following scenarios:
- Security aspects on enhancements to LCS to support AI/ML based Positioning considering the conclusions in TR 38.843[2] and TR 23.700-84[3].
- Security aspects of cross-domain (i.e. 5G Core and AF) Vertical Federated Learning, including authorization of members of the VFL group and security aspects of enhancements on the architecture in TR 23.700-84 [3] to support VFL. |
33.790 | Study on the security support for the next generation real time communication services phase 2 | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.790/33790-j10.zip | |
33.794 | Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.794/33794-j10.zip | The present document studies enablers for Zero-Trust Security in the 5G System. The document specifically includes security analysis with recommendations, key issues, potential security requirements and solutions with respect to the following objectives:
1. Data exposure for security evaluation and monitoring
- Identify potential threats and attacks on the 5G SBA layer intended to identify which data may be relevant to be exposed, and whether additional data exposure is necessary to detect the threats and attacks.
NOTE 1: The external security evaluation and monitoring is up to operator’s implementation and outside the 3GPP domain. The aspects to enable OAM based data collection are not in scope of the present document. The necessary adaptations specific to exposure services for providing data to the external security function.
2. Security mechanism for dynamic policy enforcement |
33.905 | Recommendations for Trusted Open Platforms | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.905/33905-j00.zip | |
33.916 | Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP network products | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.916/33916-j00.zip | |
33.919 | 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.919/33919-j00.zip | |
33.924 | Identity management and 3GPP security interworking; Identity management and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) interworking | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.924/33924-j00.zip | |
33.926 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes | TR | 19.4.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.926/33926-j40.zip | The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class. |
33.927 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); threats and critical assets in 3GPP virtualized network product classes | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.927/33927-j00.zip | |
33.928 | ADMF logic for provisioning Lawful Interception (LI) | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.928/33928-j10.zip | |
33.929-1 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based services | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-1/33929-1-001.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based services that focus on illustrating the LI aspects of session-based IMS sessions which include the architecture topologies and the call flows covering basic sessions, redirected sessions, target non-local ID, conferencing, roaming (Local Breakout and Home-routed) scenarios. The IMS based STIR/SHAKEN related LI reporting are illustrated in TR 33.929-2 [10].
The LI for IMS-based services is agnostic to the packet core network. |
33.929-2 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based STIR/SHAKEN | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-2/33929-2-001.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based STIR/SHAKEN that focus on illustrating various STIR/SHAKEN related LI reporting scenarios that go along with the LI for IMS based services (TR 33.929-1 [10]). |
33.929-3 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for messaging services | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-3/33929-3-001.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the illustrations related LI for Messaging Services that include SMS over NAS and SMS over IP. |
33.929-4 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for data in 5G core | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-4/33929-4-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3], TS 33.128 [4] and TR 33.928 [5].
The present document that covers the illustrations for LI for Data in 5G Core include the LI aspects of data interception focussing on the PDU session related events including the handover cases. |
33.929-5 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for ID association caching | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-5/33929-5-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3], TS 33.128 [4] and TR 33.928 [5].
The present document that covers illustrations of ID Association Caching focus on the capabilities used to provide the temporary identity to permanent identity (and vice-versa) associations known to the CSP network. The illustrations include the architectural concepts and few examples of use-cases encountering various timing scenarios. |
33.929-6 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based RCS | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-6/33929-6-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based RCS that include the illustrations covering the architecture topologies and the call flows when the RCS service is offered by the CSP or by a Third Party Provider. The LI for IMS based services are illustrated in TR 33.929-1 [10].
The LI for IMS-based RCS is agnostic to the packet core network. |
33.929-7 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI location acquisition capabilities | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-7/33929-7-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for Location Services that include the illustrations covering the conceptual overview and the flow diagrams for location reporting, LALS and Location Acquisition. |
33.929-8 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for MMS | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-8/33929-8-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for MMS that include the illustrations covering the conceptual overview and the flow diagrams for MMS. |
33.929-9 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for PTC | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-9/33929-9-002.zip | |
33.935 | Study on detailed Long Term Key Update Process (LTKUP) detailed solutions | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.935/33935-j00.zip | |
33.936 | Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP virtualized network products | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.936/33936-j00.zip | |
33.937 | Study of mechanisms for Protection against Unsolicited Communication for IMS (PUCI) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.937/33937-j00.zip | |
33.938 | 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory | TR | 19.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.938/33938-j20.zip | |
33.969 | Study on security aspects of Public Warning System (PWS) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.969/33969-j00.zip | |
33.980 | Liberty Alliance and 3GPP security interworking; Interworking of Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.980/33980-j00.zip | |
33.995 | Study on security aspects of integration of Single Sign-On (SSO) frameworks with 3GPP operator-controlled resources and mechanisms | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.995/33995-j00.zip | |
34.109 | Terminal logical test interface; Special conformance testing functions | TS | 19.0.0 | R2 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.109/34109-j00.zip | |
34.124 | Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) requirements for mobile terminals and ancillary equipment | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.124/34124-j00.zip | |
34.131 | Test Specification for C-language binding to (Universal) Subscriber Interface Module ((U)SIM) Application Programming Interface (API) | TS | 19.0.0 | C6 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.131/34131-j00.zip | |
34.229-2 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) specification | TS | 19.3.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-2/34229-2-j30.zip | |
34.229-3 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 3: Abstract test suite (ATS) | TS | 19.2.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-3/34229-3-j20.zip | |
34.926 | Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC); Table of international requirements for mobile terminals and ancillary equipment | TR | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.926/34926-j00.zip | |
35.201 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 1: f8 and f9 specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.201/35201-j00.zip | |
35.202 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 2: Kasumi specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.202/35202-j00.zip | |
35.203 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.203/35203-j00.zip | |
35.204 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.204/35204-j00.zip | |
35.205 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: General | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.205/35205-j00.zip | This report is a description of the work undertaken by an ETSI SAGE Task Force on the design of the Milenage Algorithm Set: an example set of 3GPP Authentication and Key Generation Functions.
The 3GPP Authentication and Key Generation Functions are not standardized. An example set of these algorithms has been produced on request from 3GPP with the intent that it shall be offered to the UMTS operators, to utilise instead of developing their own. An ETSI SAGE Task Force has carried out this work.
The requirement specification from 3GPP stated that operator personalisation of the example set shall be possible and that the basic kernel shall be possible to replace.
The example set is based on the block cipher Rijndael, which at the time was one of the AES candidates and the specification describes how the 7 algorithms used in 3GPP authentication and key generation are scheduled around this basic kernel. The specification and associated test data for the example algorithm set is documented in three documents:
- A formal specification of both the modes and the example kernel [3]
- A detailed test data document, covering modes and the example kernel [4]
- A "black box" test data document [5]
A detailed summary of the evaluation is provided in a public evaluation report [6]
This report gives an overview of the overall work by the task force. |
35.206 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 2: Algorithm specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.206/35206-j00.zip | |
35.207 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.207/35207-j00.zip | |
35.208 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.208/35208-j00.zip | |
35.215 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 1: UEA2 and UIA2 specifications | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.215/35215-j00.zip | |
35.216 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 2: SNOW 3G specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.216/35216-j00.zip | |
35.217 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.217/35217-j00.zip | |
35.218 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.218/35218-j00.zip | |
35.221 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 1: EEA3 and EIA3 specifications | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.221/35221-j00.zip | |
35.222 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 2: ZUC specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.222/35222-j00.zip | |
35.223 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.223/35223-j00.zip | |
35.231 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: Algorithm specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.231/35231-j00.zip | The present document and the other Technical Specifications in the series, TS 35.232 [15] and 35.233 [16] contain an example set of algorithms which could be used as the authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5* for 3GPP systems. All seven functions are operator-specifiable rather than being fully standardised and other algorithms could be envisaged. |
35.232 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 2: Implementers’ test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.232/35232-j00.zip | |
35.233 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 3: Design conformance test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.233/35233-j00.zip | |
35.234 | Specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set; An example set of 256-bit 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* and f5**; Document 1: General | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.234/35234-j00.zip | The present document contains a high level specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set which constitutes an example set of 3GPP authentication and key generation functions with a 256-bit target security level.
The example set is based on the block cipher Rijndael-256-256 with 256-bit key and 256-bit block size [8, 14] (recall that the 128 bit Advanced Encryption Standard, AES-128, corresponds to Rijndael-128-128 [8]).
An optional-to-use function, f5**, was designed according to candidate solutions discussed in 3GPP SA3 [12], with the aim of countering certain replay attacks that can lead to traceability of subscribers [13]. When used, the optional function f5** replaces f5*.
The specification and associated test data for the example algorithm set is documented in two documents:
- A formal specification of the mode and the example kernel [2].
- A detailed test data document, covering mode and the example kernel [3].
A detailed summary of the evaluation is provided in a public evaluation report [4].
The present document provides an overview of the overall work. |
35.235 | Specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set; An example set of 256-bit 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* and f5**; Document 2: algorithm specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.235/35235-j00.zip | This document contains a detailed specification of the general framework for the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set, together with specification for the cryptographic kernel used to instantiate the algorithm set.
The main new requirement for the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set, compared to previous 3GPP authentication and key generation functions, is to provide a 256-bit target security level, mainly motivated by future proofing 3GPP networks in case larger scale quantum computers become practical in the future. While this level of security can already be provided by the previously defined TUAK algorithm set [10], having another algorithm set, based on a different cryptographic kernel, provides a fallback, in case of future advances in conventional (non-quantum-computing based) cryptanalysis of the hash-function Keccak, the kernel used in TUAK.
The framework for MILENAGE-256 largely mirrors that of the previously defined MILENAGE algorithm set [9], but with a few important differences as discussed later in the present document.
In terms of the cryptographic kernel, MILENAGE-256 requires the use of a kernel mapping 256-bit inputs to 256-bit outputs, under the control of a 256-bit secret key. The present document provides kernel based on direct use of the Rijndael-256-256 block cipher with 256-bit block and key size.
The reader may recall that Rijndael was the candidate algorithm selected by NIST as the Advanced Encryption Standard, though the option to use a 256-bit block size was not adopted as part of the NIST AES requirements [5].
The algorithm set is named MILENAGE-256 since the intention is to provide full 256-bit security, which requires the use of 256-bit keys. Nonetheless MILENAGE-256 supports both 128-bit and 256-bit keys, to facilitate the transition to 256-bit security. If MILENAGE-256 is employed in a context containing components that do not yet support 256-bit keys, 128-bit keys can initially be employed, though it is recommended that the implementation supports a mechanism for transitioning to 256-bit keys in the future.
Associated test data for the MILENAGE-256 example algorithm set appears in a partner document comprising detailed test data, covering modes and the example kernel, and general design conformance test data [3].
Provisions are further made so that operators who so desire can customise the algorithm set to different degrees, providing some level of separation/isolation between implementations used by different operators. |
35.236 | Specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set; An example set of 256-bit 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* and f5**; Document 3: Implementors’ test data and design conformance test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.236/35236-j00.zip | The present document provides test data (also known as test vectors) that implementors can use to help verify that their implementations are correct, according to the technical specifications of MILENAGE-256 algorithm set [2,3]. A reference implementation in C/C++ is also provided in the Annex. |
35.246 | Specification of the ZUC based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA6 encryption, the 256-NIA6 integrity, and the 256-NCA6 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 1: algorithm specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.246/35246-j00.zip | The present document contains the algorithm specification which could be used as the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA6, 256-NIA6 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA6 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.249 | Specification of an example algorithm for f5** function for MILENAGE and Tuak; Algorithm specification and test data | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.249/35249-j10.zip | The present document presents an optional security enhancement for the MILENAGE [5, 6, 12, 13] and Tuak example algorithm set [7, 14, 15] for the 3GPP authentication and key agreement functions. The enhancement addresses a subscriber traceability issue discovered by academic researchers [9] and is provided as an alternative anonymity key generation function f5** that, when enabled, replaces the f5* function of the aforementioned example algorithm sets. A functionally equivalent security enhancement is already included in the new MILENAGE-256 example algorithm set [8]. |
35.909 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: an example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 5: Summary and results of design and evaluation | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.909/35909-j00.zip | |
35.919 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 5: Design and evaluation report | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.919/35919-j00.zip | |
35.924 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 4: Design and Evaluation Report | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.924/35924-j00.zip | |
35.934 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 4: Report on the design and evaluation | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.934/35934-j00.zip | |
35.935 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 5: Performance evaluation | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.935/35935-j00.zip | |
35.936 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2 ,f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 6: Security assessment | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.936/35936-j00.zip | |
35.937 | Specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set; An example set of 256-bit 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* and f5**; Document 4: summary and results of design and evaluation | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.937/35937-j00.zip | The present document contains a detailed summary of the work performed during the design and evaluation of MILENAGE-256 algorithm set. It contains results and findings from this work and should be read as a supplement to the specifications of the algorithms [3] and the general project report [2].
The example set is based on the block cipher Rijndael-256-256 with 256-bit key and block size [8, 24] (recall that the 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard, AES-256, corresponds to Rijndael-128-256 [9], where the notation Rijndael-b-n is defined in clause 3.2 below).
An optional-to-use function, f5** with the aim of countering certain replay attacks that can lead to traceability of subscribers [20], was designed according to candidate solutions discussed in 3GPP TR 33.846 [12]. When used, the optional function f5** replaces f5*.
The specification and associated test data for the example algorithm set is documented in two documents:
- A formal specification of the mode and the example kernel [3]
- A test data document, covering mode and the example kernel [4] |
36.102 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception for satellite access | TS | 19.2.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.102/36102-j20.zip | |
36.106 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); FDD repeater radio transmission and reception | TS | 19.1.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.106/36106-j10.zip | |
36.108 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Satellite Access Node radio transmission and reception | TS | 19.2.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.108/36108-j20.zip | |
36.111 | Location Measurement Unit (LMU) performance specification; Network based positioning systems in Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.111/36111-j00.zip | |
36.112 | Location Measurement Unit (LMU) conformance specification; Network based positioning systems in Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.112/36112-j00.zip | |
36.113 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Base Station (BS) and repeater ElectroMagnetic Compatibility (EMC) | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.113/36113-j00.zip | |
36.116 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Relay radio transmission and reception | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.116/36116-j00.zip | |
36.117 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Relay conformance testing | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.117/36117-j00.zip | |
36.124 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) requirements for mobile terminals and ancillary equipment | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.124/36124-j00.zip | |
36.143 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); FDD repeater conformance testing | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.143/36143-j00.zip | |
36.171 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Requirements for Support of Assisted Global Navigation Satellite System (A-GNSS) | TS | 19.1.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.171/36171-j10.zip | |
36.181 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Satellite Access Node conformance testing | TS | 19.2.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.181/36181-j20.zip |
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